Aleppo’s Importance to Iran and Iran’s Logistics Networks
Syria’s population and urban centers are concentrated in the west, largely because the east is desert while the west consists of more fertile, habitable areas. This natural geography has directly shaped the distribution of the population. Accordingly, the Aleppo–Idlib–Latakia–Homs–Damascus axis is home to approximately 75 percent of Syria’s population. Holding this axis therefore means controlling not only most of the population but also economic resources, infrastructure, transport networks, and agricultural land. Beirut forms an extension of this axis at its southern end. It is worth recalling that Damascus and Beirut are approximately 100–110 kilometers apart by road.
Aleppo lies at the northern end of this axis. Backed by Russia and Iran, the Syrian army succeeded in driving opposition forces out of it in 2016, securing the road to Damascus from that point onward. Alongside this north–south axis within Syria, the route linking Iran, Iraq, and Syria is critically important to Iran. Although it has numerous connecting routes, its main branches are known as the northern, central, and southern corridors. Setting aside all sectarian questions and debates, control over these transport routes is vital to Iran.
These routes matter to Iran for several reasons, but two stand out. First, their security enables logistical support to reach Lebanon and Hezbollah, one of the most important pillars of the strategy Iran calls the “Resistance Front.” The routes function like arteries, carrying the logistical lifeblood of Iran-linked groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Second, these roads underpin Iran’s strategy of reaching the eastern Mediterranean. Iran uses them to supply not only its proxies but also its own country. Given the PYD’s and PKK’s presence in Syria and Iraq, these networks are also one of the foundations of cooperation between Iran, the PKK, and Sulaymaniyah. They give Iranians direct access to Damascus, Latakia, and Lebanon, providing an outlet to the eastern Mediterranean.
The Iran–Iraq–Syria axis is also important for smuggling. Many goods that Iran cannot access because of sanctions are procured along these routes. Various other goods, including drugs and weapons, also pass through them, helping finance different groups. As noted above, distribution within Iraq follows three main corridors. The northern corridor begins in northwestern Iran and runs through Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Mosul toward southern Türkiye and northeastern Syria. Active particularly since 2017, this corridor forms a quadrilateral linking Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Türkiye. An increase in methamphetamine and heroin trafficking has been observed along this route.
The central corridor begins in Syria and enters Iraq’s Anbar province. From there, one branch heads toward Nineveh to the north and another toward Baghdad in the central east. The main route continues south through Ramadi, Fallujah, Karbala, and Najaf, reaching Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This route is used especially to transport Captagon pills produced in Syria.
The route known as the southern corridor runs from Iran’s port of Khorramshahr to Iraq’s ports of Basra and Umm Qasr. Alongside many other goods, this strategic trading area handles contraband—and even people—carried to the border through Iran in inexpensive passenger cars known as “shuti,” as well as methamphetamine, opium, and cannabis, particularly from Afghanistan. During periods when Shiites cross into Iraq to visit its holy sites—the pilgrimage days, or Ayyam al-Ziyarah—goods are carried by taxi drivers and passengers, as well as in small boats across the Shatt al-Arab.
In short, all these logistics routes are strategically important to Iran as it grapples with the many difficulties imposed by sanctions. They are also vital to maintaining deterrence against Israel through links to Lebanon and Syria and to implementing forward defense, one of the central concepts of Iran’s military doctrine. This explains Iranian statements emphasizing Aleppo’s strategic importance and the need to allow the “Axis of Resistance to breathe.” In other words, Aleppo is described as a “key” because of the importance of these roads, whose overall shape roughly resembles a T lying on its side and pointing left.
Repercussions in Iran of the Opposition’s Success in Aleppo
The opposition’s advance on Aleppo at a speed that surprised everyone, and its success there, provoked a strong reaction in Iran from the outset. Troll accounts on social media, along with some well-known figures seeking to sustain their online influence by behaving like trolls, began directing severe insults at Türkiye and President Erdoğan. In contrast to the press and these social media accounts, Iranian officials exercised greater restraint, avoiding accusations against Türkiye and issuing statements of support for Syria and its government.
While events were still unfolding, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said armed elements had attacked Iran’s consulate general in Aleppo and strongly condemned the attack. “Under the existing agreements among the three guarantors of the Astana process, the outskirts of Aleppo and Idlib are designated de-escalation zones. Attacks by terrorist groups on these areas constitute a grave violation of the Astana agreements and seriously jeopardize the positive gains of this process,” Baghaei said. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and a prominent conservative figure, stated: “The movements of the new terrorist-takfiri groups are part of the plan of America and the illegitimate Zionist regime. Syria’s neighbors must remain vigilant and not fall into their trap. Having defeated the Zionist regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Axis of Resistance will continue to support the Syrian state and people against a new conspiracy, just as they have in the past.” Finally, Iran’s ambassador to Beirut said: “As Russia, Iran, and Syria, we will not allow what happened in Syria in previous years to happen again.”
The next day, particularly in Iran’s conservative press, the language grew much harsher. The main arguments circulating in the press and on social media can be listed as follows:
- “Türkiye is acting in concert with Israel.”
- “Where were Erdoğan’s soldiers while the Zionist army was committing massacres in Gaza?”
- “Türkiye supports the Salafists.”
- “Türkiye is sowing discord among Muslims.”
- “After Gaza and Lebanon, Israel is opening a new front together with Türkiye.”
The tone in the press became somewhat calmer, particularly on the day after Hakan Fidan and Abbas Araghchi met on Monday, December 2. The hijab law and Javad Zarif’s call for dialogue with the world moved to the top of the agenda. Nevertheless, although its prominence diminished, Aleppo remained in the news. For example, a news analysis published by Tasnim News Agency on December 3 under the headline “Five Threats to Türkiye from Playing the Terrorism Card in Syria” argued that the situation posed five potential risks to Türkiye and issued “warnings.” It listed the risk of Türkiye becoming an instrument of US–Israeli plans; the possibility of a deterioration in relations with the Axis of Resistance; the prospect of terrorist organizations escaping control; potential damage to the tourism sector; and possible tensions with the Kurds. The article concluded by stressing that these risks must be considered in the interests of regional stability.
Similarly, an opinion piece titled “Türkiye’s Opportunism in the Escalation of Tensions in Syria” was published in Etemad on the same day. Its author, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, alleged that Türkiye was “recruiting fighters from Central Asia and the Caucasus,” “training militants in Syrian refugee camps,” and “using its NATO membership to play both sides between the West and the Islamic world.” Discussing the causes of instability in Syria, he argued that “the Assad administration missed many opportunities to establish its authority in Syria,” that “although it took power after a bloody war, it failed to secure popular support through a democratic program,” and that “economic and political crises continued in Syria because it was unwilling to undertake democratic reforms.”
The Hakan Fidan–Abbas Araghchi Meeting
From the moment the fighting broke out, Iran’s Foreign Ministry chose to pursue an active diplomatic process. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi first traveled to Damascus, then came to Ankara to meet Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. In statements to the press after the meeting, the Turkish side emphasized the developing relations between Iran and Türkiye, the importance of Syria’s territorial integrity, the refusal to tolerate terrorist threats against Türkiye, and the fact that the unresolved dispute between the Syrian opposition and Assad had caused the fighting. The Iranian side asked Türkiye to support Syria as well, saying: “As neighboring countries, we must take effective, rapid initiatives to prevent security and stability in Syria from being undermined.”
Since Ebrahim Raisi’s death, Iran has adopted a diplomatically active, flexible approach open to dialogue in response to each new development. In this crisis, too, Iranian officials acted quickly. Rather than managing events from a distance through press statements, they sought direct dialogue with Türkiye and discussed the search for a joint solution.
Iran’s Concerns and Türkiye’s Approach
Türkiye does not define Iran as an adversary and does not intervene directly in the other arenas in which Iran is engaged across the region. On the contrary, whenever events unfold, it consistently tries to ease tensions and mediate. In Syria, Türkiye’s principal concerns are matters that threaten its national security. The claims coming from Iran that “Türkiye is opening a new front with Israel” and “cooperating with the United States to destroy Iran and the Axis of Resistance” are therefore untrue. The cost to Türkiye of a war in Syria approaching its fifteenth year is plain to see. The prevailing chaos and fragmentation directly threaten the security of Türkiye and the region. Turkish officials, who emphasize Syria’s territorial integrity at every opportunity, also repeatedly stress the need for an approach that includes all Syrians. It is equally clear that many terrorist acts targeting Türkiye over the past decade have stemmed from the situation in Syria.
Conclusion
Reports of activity in northern Syria had been on the radar of both the Iranian press and Iranian intelligence for two months. Yet no one anticipated an operation on a scale capable of bringing down Aleppo in as little as a day. Attempts to explain these developments as “an operation conducted by Türkiye against Iran and Syria” would disregard the realities on the ground and the agency of displaced people. The Astana process was intended to reduce tensions and create an environment in which the parties could find a solution. It should not be overlooked that, after 13 years without a resolution, the persistent disregard for the opposition’s legitimate demands brought matters to this point.
Türkiye, which seeks to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity, has repeatedly stated that it will provide every form of support for normalization among the parties in Syria. President Erdoğan has also repeatedly reached out to the Syrian administration to begin a process of normalization between Türkiye and Syria. If Damascus clarifies its stance toward terrorist organizations and the opposition’s legitimate demands are taken into account, the escalation will quickly subside and a solution will emerge. This also appears to be what the parties to the Astana process want. The stance taken by Damascus is crucial here.
The main reason for the reaction in Iran is the fear that events in Aleppo will damage the investments made by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria over many years. The Iranian leadership also does not want to allow a possible loss of ground in Syria immediately after the severe strategic blows suffered by Hezbollah. This is why figures such as Abolfazl Zohrehvand, who also directed severe insults at Türkiye and President Erdoğan over the Zangezur Corridor, continue to make defamatory statements. Yet the overall stance of Iran’s establishment and government clearly differs from that of such figures. It can be said that Iranian officials will continue to pursue a solution calmly, in coordination with the parties and without escalating tensions. Indeed, from the outset, their statements have been measured and composed, setting out Iran’s position clearly without being aggressive. As Iran also seeks an end to the fighting in Lebanon, changing realities on the ground may lead it to exert greater pressure on Damascus, both for normalization between Türkiye and Syria and for normalization between the regime and the opposition within the country.
This article was first published by the Center for Iranian Studies (İRAM) on December 4, 2024.