Forward defense, one of the four prominent concepts in Iran’s military doctrine, emerged from the experience gained during the Iran–Iraq War, took shape in the early 2000s, and was fully implemented from 2016 onward. In a speech in 2019, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized that Iran should adopt a proactive approach rather than remain in a defensive position, saying, “We must not confine ourselves to our home. We must consider it our duty to identify who and what threats lie beyond the walls.”
Usually associated with proxy warfare, the activities of the Quds Force, and cross-border intelligence operations, this concept also gives a significant role to naval power alongside cyberspace, ballistic missiles, and drones. For Iran, which has now largely lost its logistical capabilities along the Lebanon–Syria axis, the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the northern Indian Ocean have become more important. Since 2020, Iranian media have carried news and analysis almost every day, with increasing frequency, on steps related to naval power and maritime development plans.
Solutions to a wide range of issues, from the country’s economic problems to security concerns, and from the impact of sanctions to enhancing its geopolitical importance, are being sought at sea. In this context, even moving the capital to southern Iran, to Makran, is being discussed, although the idea has yet to take concrete form.
Iran’s proxy networks, particularly those established in neighboring countries, have lost much of their former deterrent power because of the developments of the past year. Although some groups still have organic ties to Iran, other groups with which it cooperates accuse Iran of remaining passive and being unreliable, particularly because of its lack of response over Hezbollah.
Alongside assassinations and social unrest such as the Mahsa Amini protests in recent years, the death of Iran’s eighth president, Ebrahim Raisi, on May 19, 2024, which has not been convincingly explained, and the subsequent assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31 have also prompted Iran to focus more closely on internal security and pursue flexible policies on certain issues.
Meanwhile, the military exercises of various sizes held almost every week in recent months, sometimes more than once a week, also show that Iran’s threat perception is extremely high. Yet, as noted above, official statements and the balance of media coverage generally indicate a focus on domestic social issues. Until Ebrahim Raisi’s death, development news took second place to regional developments, and statements and reports devoted considerable space to the activities of the “resistance front.”
Iran’s defeat in Syria marked a significant turning point for the country. After December 8, a neo-Safavid discourse quickly came to the fore, and Iranian media began emphasizing the distinction between Anatolian Turks and Iranian Turks. This sought to underscore differences in identity between Turks in Türkiye and Turks in Iran. Narratives drawing parallels between the Battle of Chaldiran and Karbala attempted to erect an identity-based barrier against Türkiye’s growing influence. The language of news reporting, in particular, began to place considerable emphasis on the historical relations between “Anatolian Turks” and Syria, with many texts describing those relations as highly complex and problematic.
Engaging in an active round of diplomacy with all countries in the region, Iran turned toward steps to increase cooperation with its neighbors. On January 17, it signed an agreement of strategic importance with Russia. It sought to resolve its problems with Afghanistan swiftly. Flexibility prevailed in the negotiations with the West. While foreign policy officials pursued these moves, other officials in Masoud Pezeshkian’s government began holding development-oriented meetings at home. The military, meanwhile, prepared the armed forces for emergencies through exercises. These three moves shared a common emphasis: the importance of the southern coast.
Iran, which has long pursued what it calls the “long arm” (dast-e boland) strategy, began to place greater emphasis on it after the developments in Syria. Implemented on Ayatollah Khamenei’s own instructions, the strategy’s principal actors are Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (NEDSA), and Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, the previous NEDSA commander and current deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC. The strategy aims to extend the reach of Iran’s naval forces beyond the Persian Gulf toward the high seas and oceans.
Image: The line Iran seeks to establish as part of its forward defense concept.
The strategy has several objectives. The first is to make Iran’s military power felt not only in its territorial waters but also on the high seas and oceans. Second, preparing for the worst-case scenario, the Iranian military has been readying itself for a coalition attack since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, many concepts, including “mosaic defense” and “asymmetric capacity building,” were developed out of this concern. For the same reason, Iran is pursuing these activities to prevent attacks and hit-and-run operations originating from the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Third, Iranian planners are seeking the ability to intercept and neutralize potential threats on the high seas before they reach the country’s shores.
The strategy rests on principles such as responding forcefully to any aggressor, equipping Iran’s entire coastline and the Gulf of Oman with defense systems, and pursuing aggressors on the high seas and intervening when necessary.
As of 2020, the IRGC Navy had put into effect its plan for a permanent naval deployment in the Indian Ocean and increased its patrol activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. In this context, Iran aims to build an “extraterritorial” naval force on the high seas and stresses that, if necessary, it can maintain a continuous military presence even at any point where the U.S. Navy operates.
Iran is also developing its overseas operational capabilities by commissioning long-range warships such as the Shahid Roudaki, which can carry helicopters and missiles. In short, Iran’s “long arm strategy” covers a broad geographical area encompassing the continental depths of the Middle East—the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula—and the maritime routes extending into the Indian Ocean.
Beyond its military dimensions, the strategy also has a wide range of objectives, such as building energy transit and transportation routes, launching tourism initiatives including health tourism, establishing new cities, and settling people on islands. Almost every ministry is developing plans and projects to achieve these objectives. Foreign policy officials, meanwhile, are holding talks with numerous actors, from Oman to India and from China to Russia, in an effort to prepare the diplomatic ground for implementing the project.
At this point, Iran is in a defensive position. As it focuses on overcoming internal security problems through the domestic measures discussed above, it is redirecting toward these areas the energy and resources it would otherwise devote to regaining the ground it has lost in the region. Despite all these steps, it is doubtful whether Iran can bring its southern coastal projects to fruition. Iran’s serious governance problems are an undeniable reality. Proposed investment along the southern coast is not a new issue: these projects have been discussed for more than a decade. After Syria, however, the emphasis shifted in this direction.
Although sanctions are portrayed as the only obstacle to the projects in question, they are not Iran’s only problem. Distorted attitudes toward foreigners, rivalry among factions, and a lack of confidence in the justice system keep foreign investment out of the country. It should be remembered that the world no longer has the unipolar system of 30 years ago and that Iran is a member of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India, a fellow BRICS member, has invested no more than a few hundred million dollars in Chabahar. Even that investment pledge has not yet been fully implemented. Moreover, these amounts are very small compared with China’s investment in Gwadar Port. Because of its experience with the Farzad B gas and oil field and similar matters, India has been reluctant to shift its commercial investments to Iran. In other words, past experience means that Indian companies cannot be said to fully trust Iran. Likewise, the Zahedan Railway Project, initially planned with India before Iran announced that it would proceed using its own resources, has remained unfinished for nearly 10 years.
In short, Iran has been unable to secure investment on the scale it expects from Russia, China, or India. As a result, many projects have remained only on paper to this day. Dozens of projects, such as the South Pars Gas Expansion Project, the Jask Oil Terminal and Pipeline Project, and the Bandar Abbas–Bushehr Railway Project, have faced a similar situation, with investors eventually withdrawing their investments. Sanctions are therefore not Iran’s only problem. Industrial facilities established for rent-seeking purposes despite their known lack of viability, the water crisis created by unnecessary dams, and governance problems in energy use are among the many fundamental issues Iran faces. The real question, therefore, is whether there is the will to carry out such a large package of projects simultaneously.
This article was first published by İRAM on April 3, 2025.