
At a time when the possibility of an air attack on Iran is being discussed, I believe we should look at Operation Desert Storm, one of the most important air campaigns in recent history, and revisit what happened in the opening hours of the attack, its strategic objectives, and its consequences. The following text provides details of the operation that destroyed Iraq’s entire infrastructure capacity and placed the country under immense strain in the period leading up to its invasion.
Details of the First Night’s Air Attack
- Date and Time (Local and UTC)
The first air attack on Iraq began on January 17, 1991. The operation’s opening shots were fired at approximately 2:38 a.m. local time (11:38 p.m. UTC on January 16, 1991), when early-warning radar installations on the Iraqi-Saudi border were struck. The first bombs fell on Baghdad at approximately 2:45 a.m. (11:45 p.m. UTC). This corresponded to 6:45 p.m. on January 16 on the U.S. East Coast, and CNN correspondents broadcast the opening air attack live from Baghdad to the world.
- Number and Types of Aircraft and Participating Countries
Coalition forces entered Operation Desert Storm with an enormous aerial armada. At the beginning of the war, approximately 2,430 fixed-wing aircraft had been concentrated on the Kuwait and Iraq fronts; before the ground offensive began in February 1991, this number exceeded 2,780. Approximately three-quarters of this force consisted of U.S. aircraft, drawn from the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, while the remainder belonged to the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, France, Kuwait, and other allied countries. The following table summarizes the overall size of the coalition’s air power:
| Coalition Air Power (January 1991) | Number of Aircraft |
| United States (Air Force, Navy, USMC) | ~1,800 (estimated) |
| Other Coalition Members (United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, etc.) | >600 |
| Total (at the start of the war) | ~2,430 |
| Total (February 1991) | >2,780 |
The coalition’s inventory included a wide variety of aircraft types. In the air attacks, the United States used combat aircraft such as the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F/A-18 Hornet, and A-10 Thunderbolt II; B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers; AH-64 Apache attack helicopters; and F-117 Nighthawk stealth aircraft designed to evade radar detection. The United Kingdom participated in the air campaign with Royal Air Force (RAF) Tornado GR1 bombers, approximately 50 in number, and Tornado F3 interceptors. The Royal Saudi Air Force joined the coalition with F-15C/D fighters and Tornado aircraft. France deployed Mirage 2000 and Jaguar attack aircraft. Countries such as Canada, with CF-18 Hornets; Italy, with Tornados; and Kuwait, with A-4 Skyhawks relocated to Saudi Arabia after the invasion, also contributed smaller numbers of aircraft. A total of 668 coalition aircraft had taken off and headed toward targets in Iraq before H-Hour, the designated time of the opening attack.
- The Strategy Used in the Opening Attack
The strategic priority of the opening air attack was to neutralize Iraq’s integrated air defense system and paralyze its command-and-control capabilities. At the outset of the operation, the coalition conducted an intensive SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) offensive to “blind” Iraq’s radar and antiaircraft network. The offensive began simultaneously across a wide area, using aircraft capable of deep penetration: F-117A Nighthawk stealth attack aircraft infiltrated individually and dropped bombs on predetermined high-value targets, while bombers and attack aircraft such as the F-111F Aardvark, F-15E Strike Eagle, Tornado GR1, and F-16 struck targets in different areas in support. These squadrons were accompanied by air-superiority fighters such as the F-15C Eagle and F-14 Tomcat, as well as British Tornado F3 fighter-interceptors, to prevent interference from enemy fighters.
The coalition employed intensive electronic warfare to suppress Iraqi air defenses. EA-6B Prowler and EF-111A Raven electronic jamming aircraft were brought into action to jam Iraqi radars. In addition, U.S. Air Force F-4G “Wild Weasel” aircraft and Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornets launched AGM-88 HARM antiradiation missiles against Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. This comprehensive opening blow largely silenced Iraq’s radars, air defense missiles, and antiaircraft batteries, laying the groundwork for coalition aircraft to establish complete air superiority.
At the same time, the coalition attacked Iraq’s command-and-control structures and critical communications links. Military and political leadership centers, communications facilities, and headquarters buildings in Baghdad were targeted from the first night as part of a “decapitation” strategy. The aim was to prevent senior-level direction of the Iraqi army and leave its units without coordination. Precision attacks on telecommunications centers, telephone exchanges, and broadcasting stations in the capital, in particular, disrupted both central command and the flow of information.
- Locations Targeted on the First Night
The locations targeted in the opening air attack were critical components of Iraq’s military power. In other words, the opening strikes were directed at the most sensitive sites. On the first night, the coalition delivered simultaneous blows against the following categories of targets:
Air Defense Facilities
Long-range early-warning radars, surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, including SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, and French-made Roland systems, and antiaircraft artillery positions were struck as priorities. The destruction of radar stations in border areas, in particular, prevented Iraq from detecting the approaching attack. Integrated air defense operations centers around Baghdad and other cities, such as the central command facility in the capital, were also included on the target list.
Command, Control, and Communications
Iraqi General Staff headquarters, command bunkers, leadership centers such as the Republican Palace, and the telephone exchanges, microwave communications towers, and radio transmitters forming the backbone of military communications were bombed. Telecommunications buildings and the state television station in Baghdad were also targeted. The attacks caused major disruptions to communications networks across the country.
Air Bases and Aircraft
The Iraqi Air Force’s main airfields, such as Tallil, Al-Qadisiyah (Habbaniyah), Tikrit, and occupied airfields in Kuwait, were heavily struck. Runways were destroyed with laser-guided bombs and rendered unusable, while combat aircraft in hangars and fuel storage facilities were bombed. This was intended to restrict Iraqi aircraft’s ability to take off and replenish supplies.
Strategic Military Facilities
Iraq’s known or potential weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities were also struck on the first night. Air raids were conducted in particular against targets believed to be chemical and biological weapons production centers, such as chemical facilities near Samarra. Efforts were also made to locate and destroy Scud missile launchers and storage sites, especially in the western Iraqi desert, in areas threatening Israel and Saudi Arabia. (Completely destroying mobile Scud launchers proved difficult; some survived the first night and conducted launches in the following days.)
Infrastructure and Logistics Targets
The coalition also struck critical infrastructure targets to break Iraq’s ability to sustain the war. Power plants and substations came under attack from the first night, causing blackouts in many areas, particularly Baghdad. Oil refineries and fuel depots were also among the strategic targets; the bombing of refineries reduced Iraq’s fuel production capacity. Main supply bases, ammunition stockpiles, and military storage facilities, particularly installations behind the front such as Taji and Abu Ghraib, were also targeted in the opening wave. In addition, some bridges and transportation routes were struck on the first night, particularly to hinder troop movements.
Throughout the first night, uninterrupted explosions were observed in many areas, including Baghdad. Coalition attacks struck government buildings, communications infrastructure, airfields, presidential palaces, military bases, power plants, and military production facilities in succession. This intense bombardment delivered a major shock to Iraq’s defense and administrative mechanisms, allowing the coalition to gain the strategic advantage at the very beginning of the war.
- Number of Sorties and Types of Munitions Used
In carrying out the opening attack, coalition forces conducted an intensive, planned wave of sorties. Approximately 2,775 sorties were flown in the first 24 hours of the operation. This activity included different types of bombers and fighter-bombers proceeding to targets in succession, while support aircraft, such as AWACS, tankers, and electronic warfare aircraft, remained continuously airborne. Looking at the first night alone, the coalition can be said to have launched hundreds of aircraft in successive waves on a round-the-clock basis. The types of munitions used comprised one of the most advanced combinations of ordnance employed together up to that time. The most prominent munitions and weapons were as follows:
Cruise Missiles
At the opening of the operation, U.S. naval forces conducted a large salvo attack using BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Within the first few hours, the coalition fleet—the cruiser USS San Jacinto in the Red Sea, and the cruiser USS Bunker Hill and battleships USS Wisconsin and USS Missouri in the Persian Gulf—launched a total of 52 Tomahawk missiles. These missiles delivered pinpoint strikes from long range against high-priority targets in Baghdad, such as government buildings, communications centers, and power plants. In addition, U.S. Air Force B-52G Stratofortress bombers struck targets deep inside Iraq with AGM-86C CALCM air-launched cruise missiles fired from Saudi Arabian airspace; on the first day, seven B-52s launched a total of 35 CALCMs.
Guided Bombs
The coalition used laser-guided bombs, particularly for targets requiring precision. F-117A Nighthawks struck important targets in Baghdad with a high degree of accuracy using the GBU-27 Paveway III laser-guided bombs they carried. F-111F and F-15E aircraft similarly used laser-guided munitions. Rangefinder/TV-guided bombs, such as the AGM-62 Walleye or GBU-15, were also used against some targets. With guided munitions, the coalition sought to destroy selected targets through precision strikes in order to minimize civilian casualties.
Antiradar Missiles
AGM-88 HARM antiradiation missiles were used extensively to suppress Iraq’s air defense network. Launched from F/A-18 Hornets and EA-6B Prowlers, these missiles targeted Iraqi SAM batteries with actively emitting radars. On the first day in particular, the coalition fired hundreds of HARMs, disabling many radars before they could launch missiles. In this way, Iraq’s integrated air defense system had its “teeth pulled.”
Conventional Bombs
Traditional general-purpose bombs, such as the Mk-82 and Mk-84, which were less technologically advanced than guided munitions but accounted for a large share by quantity, were also used extensively in the operation. B-52 strategic bombers conducted intensive carpet bombing, particularly against frontline trenches, armored units, and logistics targets, raining down tons of high explosives. These conventional munitions accounted for most of the bombs dropped by the coalition; the total weight of the bombs dropped is estimated at approximately 88,500 tons. Coalition forces also used special munitions when needed, including cluster bombs and the large-blast BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter.”
Other Munitions and Weapons
AH-64 Apache helicopters struck radar facilities with Hellfire missiles on the first night. A-10 Thunderbolt IIs and AV-8B Harriers used AGM-65 Maverick missiles and 30 mm/25 mm cannon rounds against armored targets. The Navy’s battleships Missouri and Wisconsin heavily bombarded land targets with naval guns. All these different systems were employed in combination during the opening attack, with the aim of creating a “shock and awe” effect on Iraq’s defensive power.
In short, the coalition’s sortie rate and use of munitions were extremely intensive from the first night onward. The approximately 2,800 sorties flown on the first day resulted in thousands of bombs and missiles hitting Iraqi air, ground, and communications targets. These numbers were sustained at a high operational tempo in the following days of the campaign.
- Aircraft Departure Points (Bases and Aircraft Carriers)
The Desert Storm air campaign was conducted from bases and platforms spread across a wide geographical area. Coalition aircraft took off primarily from air bases in Saudi Arabia. Important operating bases included Dhahran, Riyadh, Taif, Khamis Mushait, and King Fahd air bases. For example, the F-117A stealth aircraft squadron conducted its operations from Khamis Mushait Air Base in western Saudi Arabia. Allied contingents also used various airfields in the region, such as Muharraq Air Base in Bahrain for British RAF Tornados and Al-Asnam Air Base in Saudi Arabia for French aircraft.
Aircraft carriers were another critical component of the operation. The U.S. Navy launched air raids simultaneously from both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Six aircraft carriers were operating in the region as of the night of the opening attack:
In the Persian Gulf: The aircraft carriers USS Midway (CV-41) and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) dispatched F/A-18, A-6, and F-14 aircraft from within the Gulf to targets in Iraq and Kuwait.
In the Red Sea: The aircraft carriers USS Ranger (CV-61), USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and USS Saratoga (CV-60) launched air raids from the northern Red Sea toward western Iraq and Kuwait. USS America (CV-66) was also initially stationed in the Red Sea and participated in the air campaign, before moving to the Persian Gulf later in the war.
Aircraft from the squadrons aboard these carriers, including F-14s, F/A-18s, A-7s, and EA-6Bs, participated in the strikes by supporting forces from land bases from the sea. Iraq thus faced a two-front air attack approaching from both the south and the west.
U.S. strategic bombers operated from bases outside the region. One particularly striking example involved seven B-52s that took off from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, flew for 35 hours without stopping, covered 14,000 miles, struck their targets in Iraq, and returned to the United States. This operation was recorded as one of the longest-range air attacks up to that time and demonstrated U.S. global air power.
- Weather and Environmental Conditions
The opening air attack took place at night and under somewhat difficult weather conditions. It was completely dark in Baghdad at the time of the attack, as it was 2:45 a.m. local time. Indeed, the moon had set before the attack that night. Natural illumination was therefore minimal, and the darkness of night prevailed. This was, of course, a deliberate choice. Darkness made coalition aircraft, particularly stealth aircraft, harder to detect and increased the element of surprise.
In terms of the weather, cloud layers were present over Saudi Arabia, extending northward into Iraqi skies. Although this cloud cover reduced visibility in some areas, it did not prevent execution of the overall operational concept. Advanced aircraft such as the F-117 were able to fly above the clouds and strike their targets with precision guidance. The clouds also restricted the Iraqi side’s ability to obtain visual confirmation and track aircraft optically.
As the operation began, sirens sounded in Baghdad and the electricity grid was shut down as a protective measure, leaving much of the city in darkness. When the air attack started, Iraqi defenses began sweeping the sky with powerful searchlights and intense antiaircraft fire. The dark skies were illuminated by the tracer flashes of antiaircraft shells and missiles bursting in succession. CNN correspondents relayed the explosions appearing on Baghdad’s horizon and the intense antiaircraft fire rising into the sky to the world in real time during their live broadcast.
In summary, the opening attack was carried out by taking advantage of nighttime darkness and favorable weather. Thanks to its technological superiority, the coalition successfully conducted the operation even in low visibility by using night-vision systems, infrared targeting, and precision guidance. The weather did not pose a serious obstacle; it even worked partly in the coalition’s favor. The Iraqi side, by contrast, had to defend itself in darkness and partial cloud cover.
- Iraq’s Air Defense Response and the State of Its Radar Systems
Although Iraqi air defenses took a series of countermeasures when the opening air attack began, they proved largely ineffective against the coalition’s overwhelming pressure. At the outset of the operation, eight U.S. AH-64 Apache helicopters, designated “Task Force Normandy,” destroyed two critical early-warning radar bases on Iraq’s southern border in a surprise raid. This unexpected blow delivered the first shock to Iraq’s air defense network and eliminated its ability to provide warning of the approaching large-scale attack.
When the first coalition aircraft appeared over Baghdad and other cities, Iraqi forces responded with intense antiaircraft fire. Air defense units launched SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missiles in succession against threats approaching the cities, while antiaircraft guns fired thousands of rounds. The tracers fired over Baghdad appeared in camera footage almost like a shower of fireworks. However, this intense “barrage” had only a limited effect on coalition aircraft. Iraq’s older-generation, Soviet-made, radar-guided SAMs struggled to score hits against coalition aircraft equipped with electronic warfare and deception countermeasures. Indeed, the coalition’s loss of only 75 aircraft, 42 of them to enemy fire, despite flying more than 100,000 sorties demonstrates just how ineffective Iraqi air defenses proved to be.
Iraq’s integrated air defense system, the “KARI” network built by the French company Thomson-CSF, was largely paralyzed by the coalition offensive. Attacks by Wild Weasel aircraft destroyed many radar centers before they could use their missiles to full effect. Unlike North Vietnamese tactics during the Vietnam War, Iraqi SAM operators continued to keep their radars switched on and attempted to guide their missiles. This made them exposed targets for AGM-88 HARM missiles. Because they were slow to shut down their radar emissions, many SAM batteries were struck before they could reach the missile-launching stage. Shoulder-fired MANPADS missiles such as the SA-7/14 were also launched, but these systems proved largely ineffective against high-altitude jets in the darkness of night.
Another significant event on the first night was the Iraqi Air Force’s limited attempt at a counteroperation. As the air attack began, some Iraqi combat aircraft, including MiG-29s and MiG-25s, attempted to take off. One such incident involved a MiG-25 Foxbat fighter flown by an experienced Iraqi pilot, who fired a missile from long range at a radar contact and shot down a U.S. Navy F/A-18C Hornet. U.S. pilot Capt. Scott Speicher was killed in this attack, which became the coalition’s first aircraft loss. Apart from this isolated success, however, the Iraqi Air Force’s overall resistance remained very weak. Aside from a few engagements, most Iraqi aircraft did not enter combat. In the following days, the Iraqi leadership also sent a significant portion of its aircraft to Iran for safety. More than 115 Iraqi aircraft sought refuge on Iranian territory during the war.
Iraq’s antiaircraft guns continued to pour out heavy fire throughout the air attack. In Baghdad in particular, 23 mm and 57 mm antiaircraft batteries fired thousands of rounds into the sky each minute. However, coalition pilots quickly changed their altitudes and tactics in response to Iraq’s “barrage” tactic, opting to dive from safer high altitudes rather than fly at risky low altitudes. This further reduced the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire.
Ultimately, Iraq’s air defense response was insufficient to repel the opening attack. During the first night, the coalition largely dismantled Iraq’s radar network, silenced numerous SAM batteries, and gained air superiority. Iraq’s integrated defense system lost its coordination; although some central command facilities survived the opening blow, such as the main air defense headquarters in Baghdad, which continued operating for a short time, defensive capabilities across the country became localized and fragmented. By the end of the first 24 hours, Iraqi airspace had come under effective coalition control.

The Overall Course and Consequences of the Operation
Total Sorties and Munitions Used (Overall Statistics)
Operation Desert Storm concluded with a short ground offensive following five weeks of intensive aerial bombardment. The overall scale of the air campaign was extremely impressive. During the air attacks between January 17 and February 28, 1991, coalition aircraft flew more than 100,000 sorties and dropped a total of 88,500 tons of bombs. These figures placed the campaign among the most intensive strategic aerial bombardments in history up to that point. The following table summarizes some of the operation’s overall statistics:
| Indicator (1991 Air Campaign) | Value |
| Total coalition sorties | > 100,000 sorties |
| Total weight of bombs dropped | ~ 88,500 tons |
| Tomahawk cruise missiles launched (total) | 288 (out of 290 attempts) |
| Tomahawks that hit their targets | 242 (hits) |
| Coalition aircraft losses (air campaign) | 75 (42 combat, 33 accidents) |
The figures above demonstrate both the destructiveness and the effectiveness of the coalition’s air campaign. Although the proportion of precision-guided munitions used was relatively low, since most of the ordnance dropped consisted of conventional bombs, these precision weapons played a decisive role against critical targets. For example, F-117A stealth aircraft alone struck nearly 40% of all targets without missing a single one and flew and returned from more than 1,270 sorties during the war, without suffering any losses. This demonstrates the success of the precision-strike concept.
The coalition fleet launched a total of 290 Tomahawk cruise missiles during the war. Approximately 242 successfully hit their targets; the remainder either malfunctioned or failed to find their targets. This was the first large-scale use of cruise missiles at the time, and they proved highly effective.
The coalition kept its own losses very low throughout the air campaign. A total of 75 fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft were lost, only 42 of them to enemy fire. In other words, Iraq’s air and ground defenses were effective against only a very small proportion of the coalition’s total sorties, approximately four per thousand. The coalition’s use of superior technology, well-planned SEAD operations, and the shortcomings of Iraqi air defenses played important roles in this success.
Devastating Effects on Iraq’s Infrastructure
In addition to military targets, the aerial bombardment campaign inflicted major damage on Iraq’s critical civilian infrastructure. In particular, damage to the electricity and communications systems targeted from the opening days of the war quickly had effects across the entire country.
The electricity grid: The coalition strategy included temporarily or permanently collapsing Iraq’s electricity generation capacity. Although graphite filament bombs were initially dropped on some power plants to cause temporary outages through short circuits, these plants were subsequently put completely out of action with conventional bombs. Baghdad’s main power generation facilities, such as the Dora thermal power plant, were bombed repeatedly. According to a U.S. Air Force report, Iraq’s national electricity generation was reduced to almost zero in the first weeks of the war. All major power plants were damaged or shut down. This plunged cities into darkness and rendered vital infrastructure services inoperable. Without electricity, water treatment and pumping facilities also stopped functioning, leaving large sections of the population struggling to find clean drinking water, while sewerage and wastewater treatment systems collapsed.
Postwar assessments noted that the collapse of the electricity grid caused a water and sanitation crisis that seriously threatened public health.
Transportation and industrial infrastructure: The air attacks also targeted Iraq’s transportation network. Coalition aircraft sought to restrict army units’ ability to maneuver and resupply by bombing strategically important bridges and roads. For example, some main bridges linking Baghdad to southern cities were destroyed with laser-guided bombs. Bombed sections of important routes such as the Basra-Baghdad highway were found in ruins after the war. Railway facilities and rail bridges were also struck in some areas. In addition, oil refineries that were the lifeblood of Iraq’s economy, such as the Baiji, Musayyib, and Basra refineries, and petrochemical facilities were targeted, bringing production to a standstill. Factories, weapons production facilities, and storage sites, such as military vehicle factories and ammunition plants, were also heavily damaged. A report on the subject stated that, by the end of the war, Iraq’s industrial infrastructure had suffered destruction approaching the level seen in Europe during World War II.
Communications systems: Beyond all this, coalition forces conducted planned attacks to isolate Iraq in terms of both military and civilian communications. In the opening hours of the war, main telephone exchange buildings in Baghdad, such as the Al-Mamoun exchange, and microwave communications towers were struck with guided bombs. Satellite ground stations, the country’s gateway to international communications, were disabled. State radio and television transmitters, such as the Baghdad television center, were also bombed, interrupting broadcasts. These attacks dealt a major blow to Iraq’s internal communications. Army units struggled to receive instructions from their senior command, while the public lost access to current information. The civilian telephone network also remained inoperable for weeks. The damage to communications infrastructure could not be repaired for a long time after the war, creating an isolated information environment in Iraq.
Water and sewerage: Although they were not directly targeted, water distribution systems were hit by the collapse of electricity and transportation infrastructure. With electric pumps unable to operate, water could not be supplied to municipal networks, and treatment plants stopped functioning. Clean water shortages soon emerged in many cities, particularly Baghdad. Sewerage systems were forced to discharge untreated wastewater into rivers and streets. This created serious risks of epidemic diseases, such as cholera and typhoid, after the war. United Nations monitoring reports recorded a deepening water and sanitation crisis in many parts of Iraq by the summer of 1991.
In short, Operation Desert Storm caused enormous destruction to Iraq’s infrastructure. By the end of the war, the country’s electricity generation facilities, transportation arteries, communications lines, and industrial installations had been largely destroyed. This profoundly affected not only its military capacity but also the daily lives of Iraqis after 1991. In many respects, the infrastructure that made Iraq a modern country had been rendered inoperable after a few weeks of intensive bombardment.
Civilian Casualties and Economic Consequences
Civilian casualties
Iraqi civilians also, unfortunately, lost their lives in the 1991 Gulf War. According to official estimates made immediately after the war, 2,278 civilians were killed and 5,965 injured in Iraq. These figures represent identifiable casualties directly resulting from the bombardment. Certain incidents caused a sudden, sharp rise in civilian deaths: for example, when coalition aircraft struck the Amiriyah shelter in Baghdad on the night of February 13, 1991, at least 408 civilians inside, women and children, lost their lives. This tragic event entered history as one of the war’s largest civilian casualty incidents. Similarly, it was reported that approximately 50 to 150 civilians died on February 17 when laser-guided bombs aimed at a bridge in Fallujah missed their target and struck a nearby market area.
Civilian casualties also inevitably occurred in other cities and areas subjected to intense bombardment. Hundreds of civilians were injured or killed by shrapnel hitting shelters and by secondary explosions in places such as Basra, Nasiriyah, and Baghdad’s suburbs. The indirect consequences of the war, particularly infrastructure destruction, also led to an increase in civilian deaths afterward. A lack of clean water and health care caused many children to fall ill and die in 1991 and the years that followed. Independent sources stated that the combined direct and indirect effects could bring the civilian death toll in Iraq into the tens of thousands. Human rights organizations such as Middle East Watch reported that the 1991 war caused a major humanitarian crisis in Iraq and that deaths among children under five doubled.
Military casualties
The Iraqi army also suffered heavy loss of life in this war. Although exact figures remain disputed, estimates suggest that 20,000 to 30,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the fighting. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers died, particularly during the ground offensive, in incidents such as the destruction of retreating convoys on what became known as the “Highway of Death.” On the coalition side, approximately 240 personnel in total were reported to have died, including 148 American and 47 British troops, along with smaller losses among other allies. Considering all civilian and military deaths together, a MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project) analysis stated that the war’s human toll amounted to nearly 100,000 dead, approximately 5 million displaced people, and enormous material damage.
Economic effects
The Gulf War inflicted damage on the Iraqi economy that could not be repaired for years. Iraq’s economy, already struggling under the embargo immediately before the war, virtually collapsed under the destruction caused by the bombardment. Estimates put the total value of material damage caused by the war in Iraq at more than $200 billion. This figure includes infrastructure destruction, lost industrial production, the interruption of oil export revenues, and the general economic recession caused by the war.
Iraq’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell dramatically in 1991 compared with the previous year. Some estimates put the contraction at nearly 50%. Oil exports, the country’s main source of income, had stopped completely because of the embargo, depriving the state treasury of revenue. By the end of the war, the Iraqi government was struggling to pay civil servants’ salaries, and hyperinflation had emerged. The Iraqi dinar rapidly lost value, and basic consumer goods were sold on the black market. Unemployment also increased, as many factories and businesses had either been destroyed by bombing or become unable to produce.
Living standards in postwar Iraq fell sharply. Much of the middle class was impoverished; academics found themselves trying to earn a living as taxi drivers. Sectors such as education and health care collapsed because of inadequate infrastructure and a lack of resources. According to UNICEF reports, children’s nutrition and health deteriorated sharply between 1990 and 1991, and deaths among children under five doubled, much of this occurring under postwar embargo conditions. The war’s environmental destruction, including the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells and the release of toxic substances from industrial facilities, also adversely affected Iraqi agriculture and public health over the long term.
Postwar Sanctions and the UN Embargo
After the 1991 Gulf War, the international sanctions previously imposed on Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait remained firmly in place. In fact, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had begun imposing a comprehensive economic embargo on Iraq under Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. These sanctions prohibited the export of all goods and products to Iraq and imports from Iraq, except for humanitarian exemptions for food and medical supplies, and also froze the Iraqi government’s assets abroad. The embargo remained in force throughout the war and continued afterward under new conditions.
The formal ceasefire conditions ending the Gulf War were set out in UNSC Resolution 687 in April 1991. Under this resolution, Iraq was to agree to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—and missiles with ranges exceeding 150 km. It was explicitly stated that economic sanctions would continue until Iraq fully complied with these conditions. In other words, the embargo was not lifted after the war; instead, it was tied to Iraq’s disarmament process.
During this period, Iraq began destroying its chemical weapons and Scud missiles under UN inspectors’ supervision, but the embargo was not eased because full confidence could not be established. Iraq’s economy remained under this strict embargo throughout the 1990s. Unable to sell oil, prohibited from engaging in foreign trade, and with restricted sources of revenue, the country faced an increasingly dire humanitarian situation. UN reports documented that child deaths in Iraq doubled during the 1990s, per capita income fell sharply, and a significant portion of the population suffered from malnutrition and a lack of clean water. Basic medicines were unavailable in hospitals, electricity shortages persisted, and the education system lacked necessary supplies.
As criticism of the embargo’s humanitarian impact grew within the international community, the United Nations introduced the “Oil-for-Food” program in 1995. Launched under UNSC Resolution 986, the program allowed Iraq to export a limited amount of oil and spend the proceeds on food, medicine, and basic necessities under UN supervision. Implemented from 1996 onward, the program provided some relief but could not fully alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people. Many potentially dual-use products, such as certain chemicals and spare parts, remained on the embargo list.
Ultimately, the UN embargo remained in place against Iraq for a total of 12 years, until 2003. Following the invasion of Iraq that began in March 2003, the Second Gulf War, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the UNSC decided to lift the embargo on May 22, 2003. Nevertheless, the 1991–2003 sanctions period is remembered as one of the harshest and longest-lasting economic isolations imposed on a country in modern history. During this period, Iraq’s economic losses reached hundreds of billions of dollars, and society’s social fabric was severely damaged. The disproportionate impact of sanctions on civilians later generated extensive debate; officials such as UN Assistant Secretary-General Denis Halliday resigned in protest against the embargo over the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. The destructive legacy of the First Gulf War, which began in 1991, continued to be felt in Iraq for a long time. Both the direct consequences of the military campaign and the international sanctions imposed afterward devastated Iraq economically and socially. These events also left a lasting mark on global debates about war strategies and humanitarian law.
