Tehran views the Zangezur Corridor as a geopolitical lever with the potential to bypass Iran geoeconomically, bring the NATO/US presence closer to its northern borders, and expand Israel's intelligence and logistical reach.
Introduction
The "Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia," initialed in Washington on August 8, 2025, between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, hosted by US President Donald Trump, is a significant development with the potential to have structural effects on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. This arrangement, which contains provisions envisaging bilateral cooperation in various fields including transit and transport, has the potential to produce strategic consequences not only in terms of facilitating transport links between two neighboring states, but also in terms of Iran's northwestern border security, its connectivity on a Eurasian scale, and its regional power projection.
In its initial statements on the accord, Tehran highlighted two basic parameters: support in principle for the peace process, and explicit objection to extra-regional actors establishing a permanent security or political presence in the South Caucasus. Upon returning from the United States, Pashinyan conducted intensive telephone diplomacy with many leaders, from Russian President Vladimir Putin to President of the Republic of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on both regional issues and the accord in question. In this context, on August 11 Pashinyan also exchanged views with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the latest developments surrounding the Zangezur Corridor.
Pezeshkian emphasized that the project must be carried out within the framework of Armenia's sovereignty, that no military or security element should be involved, and that caution is needed regarding possible US activities. Pashinyan, for his part, stated that they would not sign any agreement that disregards Iran's interests and sensitivities, that relations between the two countries are strategic in nature, and that important decisions would be taken through mutual consultation. This direct contact shows that Armenia aims to proceed on a balanced line without antagonizing Iran, while also looking after its own interests. Nevertheless, the possibility of American companies taking part in the construction and operation of the corridor will continue to be a strategic red line for Tehran.
Beyond being a technical transport line, Tehran views the Zangezur Corridor, in the context of "corridor competition," as a geopolitical lever with the potential to bypass Iran geoeconomically, bring the NATO/US presence closer to its northern borders, and expand Israel's intelligence and logistical reach. In Armenia, meanwhile, the debate has so far revolved around the concept of a "corridor" and the issue of "special status." The government side argues that the US-brokered accord can contribute to the peace process and prefers the term "transport route" to "corridor" in order to emphasize that relations with Iran are "of strategic importance" and that Tehran's sensitivities have been taken into account.
In contrast, opposition parties and some civil society circles view the project as a channel of external interference that could weaken Armenia's sovereignty and consider Iran's warnings to be justified. Academic and media circles taking a more cautious approach argue that close dialogue with Iran should be maintained, but that Armenia could achieve geoeconomic gains in the long run by diversifying its regional connections through this and similar projects.
Reactions from Iran
After the 12-day conflict with Israel and the United States, Iranian officials have moved toward adopting a more balanced and constructive discourse, particularly toward neighboring countries. Although Armenia's latest move has caused unease in Tehran, Iranian elites have been seen using more diplomatic and softer language compared to previous years. The tone of commentary from media outlets and semi-official actors, however, is much harsher.
While the government side supports in principle the positive agenda between the two countries, it expresses reservations about the US presence. Indeed, the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that it welcomed the agreement in terms of its "potential contribution to the peace process," but that the permanent establishment of an extra-regional military or political presence in the South Caucasus would constitute "an obstacle to peace and stability." The statement emphasized that Iran is not opposed in principle to the opening of transport routes in the region, but that this could be acceptable only on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the region and free from external interference.
President Pezeshkian's assessments also carry a cautious tone. Pezeshkian stated that they had been given assurances that the corridor would remain under Armenia's legal sovereignty and that Iran's land connection to Europe would not be cut off. Nevertheless, he described the possibility of an American company being involved in the construction and operation process as "the only worrying element."
Despite this cautious line, reactions from semi-official actors and security circles are much harsher. Ali Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader's Senior Advisor on Foreign Policy, described the corridor in question as "a plan that will change the geopolitical structure of the region and pave the way for the fragmentation of Armenia." Velayati claimed that this US initiative would turn into "a graveyard for Trump's mercenaries" and emphasized that Iran would prevent the opening of this corridor, whether in cooperation with Russia or on its own.
Yadollah Javani, Political Deputy to the Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, likewise accused Azerbaijani President Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan of "bringing the United States, Britain, and NATO into the Caucasus," arguing that this step runs counter to the interests not only of Iran and Russia but also of China and India. Saying that "the Americans' dream of settling on Iran's northern borders will never come true," Javani sent the message that regional powers would act jointly against this development.
Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, also stated in a social media post that geopolitical changes on Iran's borders would not be allowed "at any cost." These harsh statements not only reveal the difference in tone between the official diplomatic language and the threat perception of the security institutions, but also show that domestic political actors in Tehran approach the corridor issue from different perspectives depending on the centers of power on which they rely.
Media and Expert Analyses
Assessments of the accord in the Iranian press diverge markedly along conservative and reformist lines. Conservative commentaries view the accord as a strategic gateway for the United States and NATO to settle in the South Caucasus and warn that it would make Iran a de facto neighbor of Israel on its northwestern border. In this framework, the corridor is regarded not as a transport route but as a large-scale geopolitical redesign move involving the United States, NATO, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan. According to this view, this design, which overlaps with Ankara's strategic goals, will increase Israel's logistical depth and exclude Iran, China, and Russia from regional trade networks.
Reformist approaches, on the other hand, emphasize that although the project will remain under Armenian sovereignty, it will in practice be built and operated by American companies, and that this will elevate the United States to the position of the sole effective power in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, Iran will lose its transit capacity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Moreover, according to those holding this view, even if Iran's commercial loss remains limited should the Armenian route stay open, the real strategic risk will be the permanent establishment of an American presence on the roughly 40-kilometer-long Iran-Armenia border.
Conclusion
The opening of the Zangezur Corridor has been declared a "red line" by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. From day one, Tehran has sought to convey its arguments to Yerevan in its contacts with Armenia on this specific issue. The Pashinyan government, for its part, is pursuing options in both the domestic and foreign arenas in line with its goal of turning the country into an important trade hub. On the other hand, the stabilization of the region will unquestionably have a positive impact on Iran, as on all parties. An increase in trade volume will raise the level of prosperity, especially in northwestern Iran. Furthermore, the disappearance from the agenda of the questions of "whose side Iran is on," which have diplomatically strained Iran for decades, will provide Tehran with both diplomatic relief and new room for political maneuver.
Türkiye, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia acting together in the region will bring economic vitality to all parties, especially to the settlements in eastern Türkiye and on Iran's northern border. For this reason, the issue should be addressed independently of an ideological framework, and the importance of joint action in building prosperity should be recognized. Finally, the effect of relations deepening through mutually developing ties and common interests in strengthening the security of countries cannot be denied.
This article was first published by İRAM on August 13, 2025.