Pezeshkian’s past actions and statements suggest that he differs from previous presidents. In this respect, it is possible that he will conduct his presidency somewhat “differently” and has the potential to take unconventional positions. His foreign policy goals include reconnecting with the Iranian diaspora, preventing emigration, and encouraging Iranians abroad to return home.
Iran had only just completed elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, and had not yet elected a parliamentary speaker, when Ebrahim Raisi and his accompanying delegation died in an accident. Having barely emerged from one election, Iran thus found itself preparing for another. Immediately after the mourning period for Raisi and the delegation ended, the country entered an intense election campaign. The Guardian Council approved six candidates in total: five conservatives and one reformist. Many experts considered Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf the front-runner. The outcome, however, was different. In the runoff, reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian won 53.6 percent of the 30.5 million votes cast, defeating Saeed Jalili, who received 44.3 percent, to become Iran’s new president.
Turnout was another defining issue in the election. In the first round, it fell below 40 percent, the lowest in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the second round, it reached 49.8 percent. Elected despite these low turnout figures, Pezeshkian faces a difficult task. The new president, who will soon turn 70, is a heart surgeon by profession. Having served as health minister under Mohammad Khatami, he is an experienced figure in Iranian politics. He takes office at a time when, according to official figures, Iran has experienced inflation above 40 percent for three consecutive years. His speeches indicate that he intends to use foreign policy as a means of addressing these economic problems.
A New Profile in Iranian Foreign Policy
The Islamic Republic of Iran generally follows an inflexible foreign policy that is resistant to radical change. Beyond ideology, historical experiences and geopolitical imperatives also help explain this approach. The strength of Ayatollah Khamenei and the influence of his foreign policy outlook narrow the room for maneuver of incoming governments. Pezeshkian’s messages in the week after the election suggest that he, too, will remain within this approach. His expressions of support during a telephone conversation with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and his call for constructive dialogue and cooperation with the Arab world are examples. Yet his past actions and statements suggest that he differs from previous presidents. It is therefore possible that he will conduct his presidency somewhat “differently” and has the potential to take unconventional positions.
Pezeshkian’s foreign policy goals include reconnecting with the Iranian diaspora, preventing emigration, and encouraging Iranians abroad to return home. During his campaign, he frequently identified brain drain as one of the country’s greatest problems and said he wanted to halt it and bring back the skilled people who had left. “I aim to create an environment in which citizens can live without anxiety, prevent emigration, and encourage Iranians abroad to return to the country,” he said. It is reasonable to think that Pezeshkian will seek stability in foreign policy as a way of overcoming both economic and social difficulties. This is comparable to a doctor first trying to stabilize a patient to prevent further deterioration before administering a treatment that will bring recovery. Before reversing the decline in Iran’s economy and social fabric, the Pezeshkian government will prioritize arresting the current deterioration. Its foreign policy choices will follow the same direction as circumstances permit.
During the campaign, both Pezeshkian’s opponents and sections of the Iranian press dubbed his prospective administration the “third Rouhani government,” because of the figures around him. One of the main reasons was former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s highly active role in the campaign. Although Zarif is widely considered certain not to become foreign minister in the new government, he may hold a position that allows him to influence its foreign policy choices. A post that does not require a confidence vote from the conservative-controlled parliament will probably be considered for him. If Zarif’s influence proves as strong as anticipated, the Pezeshkian administration will emphasize diplomacy to ease sanctions and improve Iran’s economy.
Pezeshkian also spoke frequently about the importance of diplomacy during the campaign. He criticized the grand slogans used in foreign policy for failing to put money in Iranians’ pockets. In other words, he believes practical policies that serve the public interest should take precedence over sweeping, ambitious slogans. He said he would avoid slogans that empty people’s pockets and take foreign policy steps that improve their lives. Renegotiating the 2015 nuclear deal and reducing tensions with the West are among his priorities in this regard. Although there are doubts about how this can be achieved in the face of conservative opposition and opposing views within the establishment, Iranian decision-makers can be expected to pursue a softer policy, more open to dialogue than under Raisi. This may seem to contradict the argument that “Iran’s foreign policy does not change,” but a distinction is necessary. What remains unchanged is the broad outline of that policy; the key question is “how” it is pursued. In contrast to the security-centered outlook that has gained ground in Iran in recent years, Pezeshkian treats foreign and domestic policy as an integrated whole and sees rational steps in foreign policy as the route to greater prosperity.
A Policy That Puts Iran First
Maintaining good relations with Russia and China is also among Pezeshkian’s foreign policy priorities, in line with Iran’s approach in recent years. “Russia is Iran’s friend and partner. Deepening and expanding relations with Russia and China, and developing relations with Asia more broadly, are defined as priorities in my foreign policy program,” he said. He can be expected to seek greater Iranian participation in multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and to expand Iran’s economic and trade ties by developing cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.
His statements suggest that Pezeshkian rejects a “single-option” approach to foreign policy and aims to build balanced relations with all countries. He made his position clear when he said: “The Islamic Republic of Iran opposes unilateral policies and supports a multilateral approach.” This could enable Iran to take a more flexible, effective position internationally. His belief in the “strong region” theory signals his aim to increase cooperation with neighboring countries and encourage regional development. The strategy seeks to support economic growth while improving regional security. In this context, he will continue to seek cooperation with Türkiye as conditions and circumstances allow. One obstacle will be domestic political rivals who accuse him of pan-Turkism and separatism.
On the nuclear deal, Pezeshkian said: “The nuclear deal is an international agreement and a document endorsed by the United Nations. My program will be to work toward the other side returning to its commitments as soon as possible and toward the lifting of sanctions.” As noted above, he sees economic and social problems as interconnected with foreign policy. Given the extent to which pressure on Iran over the nuclear issue affects social and economic conditions, he can also be expected to seek a “middle way” here. Yet, considering both the costs Iran has borne and the progress it has made in uranium enrichment, it is possible to say that Iran will want to make far fewer concessions.
The Economy Comes First
Another important element of Pezeshkian’s foreign policy vision is to increase the international legitimacy of the “Axis of Resistance.” Through vigorous diplomacy, he aims to secure recognition of it in international forums as a “liberation movement.” This, too, represents continuity with Iran’s traditional foreign policy. By describing Qasem Soleimani as “a source of national pride and a thorn in the side of enemies,” Pezeshkian also makes his position on regional policy clear.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that Pezeshkian will prioritize the economy in almost every area. Yet there are limits, and he must operate within them. Given his distinctive personality, the likelihood of clashes with institutions and other parts of the system is by no means small. The central question is how he will respond to the system after such a clash. This inevitably brings to mind Ahmadinejad’s conduct, particularly during his second term, and the events of that period. It is difficult to say today whether Pezeshkian will become another Ahmadinejad, but he can be expected to follow a distinctive course in foreign policy while preserving its broad direction.
This article was first published in Kriter on July 17, 2024.