On May 23, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation. Signed in Tehran by Ahmad-Reza Radan, commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Command, and Demelash Gebremichael, commissioner general of the Ethiopian Federal Police, the document envisages an institutional partnership between the two countries’ law enforcement agencies in areas such as combating transnational crime, training, technical cooperation, and information sharing. Although the agreement was presented to the public as a straightforward technical document, its background and strategic significance cannot be overlooked.
Since the 1979 Revolution, ideological and strategic orientations have shaped Iran’s Africa policy. Through rhetoric such as “solidarity with the oppressed” and “resistance against imperialism,” Tehran has sought to create a symbolic sphere of influence on the continent. Over time, however, this ideological approach has strained, and even severed, relations with many African countries.
In recent years, Iran has offered cooperation in areas such as the sale of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the training of security personnel to countries facing security problems, thereby strengthening its policies of influence through the assistance it provides. For example, during the Iranian law enforcement commander’s visit to Niger in May 2025, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on security and training. The agreement also provides for the training of Nigerien police and national guard personnel at Iran’s police university. Like the agreement signed with Ethiopia, this memorandum includes provisions on combating transnational crime, intelligence sharing, and strengthening security capacity.
Security cooperation talks were also held with Burkina Faso in the same year, but past examples have shown that Iran has used such rapprochements over time to spread its ideological influence. For example, cooperation involving military training, arms supplies, and intelligence sharing was established with Sudan in the 1990s. In 2015, however, Sudan severed relations with Iran and closed many Iranian institutions because of Iran’s ideological activities in the country.
Ethiopia’s strategic position and foreign policy balance
Ethiopia is one of Africa’s most important countries in terms of both its geographical location and its diplomatic weight. Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the African Union, plays a decisive role not only in decision-making processes within the continent but also in the balance of power in the Red Sea basin and East Africa. Distinguished by its population, economic potential, and military capacity, the country has long sought to position itself as a leader both regionally and across the continent.
Disputes with Egypt over the Nile, security reforms undertaken after the Tigray civil war that broke out in 2020, and periodic tensions with Somalia occupy a prominent place on Ethiopia’s foreign policy agenda. This strategic importance has made Ethiopia an indispensable partner for global and regional actors seeking a role in Africa. Numerous centers of power are developing multifaceted relations with Addis Ababa, from China’s investment projects to the port and military base strategies of Israel and the Gulf countries, and from Türkiye’s diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives to Western countries’ development-oriented policies. This diversity reflects the pursuit of “balance” that is a defining feature of Ethiopian foreign policy.
The security memorandum signed with Iran should also be assessed within this framework and viewed as an example of Ethiopia’s policy of engaging different actors without becoming dependent on any single side. Yet Ethiopia’s ability to sustain this balance depends on carefully defining the scope of its relations with each country.
What does the memorandum mean for Iran?
The countries of the Horn of Africa have long been among Iran’s strategic objectives. Unable to establish as much influence in the region as it desires, Tehran has therefore turned toward closer, albeit limited, relations with countries around the Horn or with certain groups active there. With this agreement, Iran, whose relationship with Ethiopia has historically been fluctuating and distant, has moved beyond its policy of indirect influence for the first time in a long while and shifted to a direct, formal, and institutional model of cooperation. This development can be seen as an effort to increase Iran’s visibility and legitimacy both in Africa and in international public opinion. For the Tehran administration, which has been left outside the global system particularly because of sanctions, Africa policy has now become not merely symbolic but also an economic and strategic necessity.
The memorandum also encompasses Iran’s objective of bringing its defense industry products to the African market. Iran, which has drawn attention in recent years particularly for the UAVs it has sent to Russia, aims to market these technologies in Africa as well. Indeed, various cooperation agreements to this effect were signed during official visits to Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in 2023, and plans to establish “houses of innovation and technology” were announced. The security agreement signed with Ethiopia could also formalize this technological cooperation.
The memorandum has also offered Iran an opportunity to deepen the strategic corridor stretching from Yemen to East Africa. Although Iran, which has long sought closer relations with countries around the Horn of Africa, has established a certain presence in the region, it has not achieved the level of influence it desires. Cooperation with countries on the opposite shore of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the gateway to the Red Sea, is particularly critical to Iran’s military and logistical strategy. For all these reasons, Tehran views this cooperation with Addis Ababa not only as a bilateral agreement but also as part of a strategic opening at the continental and global levels.
What does Ethiopia seek to gain?
For Ethiopia, this security cooperation with Iran may serve both to address shortcomings in internal security and to maintain strategic diversity in foreign policy. The Addis Ababa administration, whose federal security structure suffered serious weaknesses after the Tigray War, is seeking external support for its restructured security system. In this context, cooperation with Iran, which possesses defense technologies and intelligence capabilities, may be considered useful in terms of capacity building and specialist support. Training, technical hardware, equipment, and assistance in combating transnational crime provided by Iran could meet existing needs.
Ethiopia also regards this cooperation as an instrument of maneuver in diplomacy as well as security. In light of its multilateral relationships with the Gulf countries, Western states, China, and Türkiye, engagement with Iran can be seen as an effort by Addis Ababa to increase its diplomatic autonomy. Such engagements offer Ethiopia opportunities to balance different actors, increase its negotiating power, and consolidate its diplomatic influence within the continent. However, given Iran’s past record in other countries, Ethiopia needs to conduct this cooperation within a cautious and limited framework. It should be noted that the Addis Ababa administration, with its strong institutional reflexes, has the capacity to define the boundaries of the relationship.
How might the memorandum translate into practice?
Although the security memorandum signed between Iran and Ethiopia currently appears confined to a diplomatic framework, the implementation of similar agreements on the ground has generated many controversial examples in the past. Iran tends to use such documents in Africa not only as formal partnerships but also as instruments for expanding its influence on the ground. Examples such as efforts to establish a presence in Sudan through military training programs and religious foundations, activities aimed at spreading Shiism in Mauritania, and the Zakzaky movement in Nigeria reflect different forms of this approach. These processes generally begin with humanitarian assistance or cultural activities and can, over time, extend to intelligence gathering, ideological influence, and even smuggling.
Ethiopia has also had an experience of this kind in the past. In 2021, an Iran-linked intelligence cell was identified in Addis Ababa, and it was alleged that the group was targeting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) embassy. This incident demonstrated that Iran seeks to establish influence not only through overt channels but also by covert means.
Although the present memorandum was signed despite these past experiences, it indicates that relations between the two countries have entered a new stage. Still, what results this agreement will produce in practice remains an important question. Given Iran’s previous practices, such cooperation is likely to expand over time into areas such as training, technology, and security consultancy. However, Ethiopia’s strong institutions and multifaceted external relations stand out as an important balancing factor that could make it difficult for this process to develop unilaterally in Iran’s favor.
This article was first published by İRAM on May 26, 2025.