What Risks Do the US Ground Operation Scenarios for Iran Carry?
As the fourth week of the US-Iran war comes to a close, the debate in Washington has focused on a ground operation. With the view gaining ground that air and naval operations have reached their limit, the Pentagon has presented the White House with detailed plans for deploying ground forces to Iran. According to a report by CBS News on 20 March, citing senior sources, these plans also cover logistical preparations for the capture and detention of Iranian soldiers. Although no final decision has yet been taken, the character of the forces flowing into the region, the speed of their deployment and the statements of the command echelon all point to preparations that go beyond mere contingency planning.
Three scenarios on the table
The White House’s internal debate is taking shape around three distinct ground operation concepts. Each differs in force requirement, risk profile and strategic objective.
The first scenario is the seizure of Kharg Island. This island, through which 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports flow, lies roughly 25 kilometres off the Iranian coast in the Persian Gulf. US forces struck the island’s military targets on 13 March but deliberately spared its oil infrastructure. Sources close to the White House have said they believe occupying the island would “completely bankrupt” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The essential purpose of this plan might be described by analogy with pressing two fingers on the carotid artery in a person’s neck. Senator Lindsey Graham has made an explicit call along these lines. Yet if the island were seized, Iran would be expected to shut down its pipelines. Moreover, since the island lies within range of ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery fire launched from the Iranian mainland, it would be difficult for the United States to defend even if captured. For this reason any attempted landing might be described as “close to a suicide mission.”
The second scenario is a coastal operation along the Strait of Hormuz. After Iran closed the strait between 2 and 4 March, maritime traffic fell by 70 percent, more than three thousand vessels were stranded and the price of Brent crude surged into the 112-120 dollar band. According to information that has reached the press, the concept under consideration envisages the Marines landing at the port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman coast and advancing northwards towards Bandar Abbas. The aim is to clear the missile batteries, mine depots, fast attack craft bases and drone launch sites Iran has deployed along the coast. To this end CENTCOM launched an air campaign on 19 March, deploying A-10 close air support aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. Two days earlier, on 17 March, 5,000-pound GBU-72 penetrator munitions were used to destroy underground missile silos along the coast. Full operational readiness of the forces is projected for around 1 April.
The third scenario under discussion is the seizure of the enriched uranium at Isfahan. Iran holds roughly 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. If enriched further, this quantity would be sufficient to produce about eleven nuclear weapons. The material is being stored in underground tunnels beneath rubble left by the June 2025 strikes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the phrase “someone will have to go and get it” at a congressional briefing. In the American press the possible operation is described as “the largest special forces operation in history.” It is assessed that the operation would require at least 1,000 personnel. That force would include Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) elements such as Delta Force and the Navy SEALs, military engineers, heavy plant and nuclear specialists. Two approaches are under discussion: the first, physical evacuation of the material; the second, dilution of the uranium on site by specialists. Inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been unable to verify the exact location of the material for roughly nine months. This is one of the more remote scenarios.
A full-scale conventional invasion has in effect been taken off the table. Occupying Iran’s 1.6 million square kilometres of mountainous terrain would require hundreds of thousands of troops. Taking the troop density of the 2004 Battle of Fallujah as a benchmark, it is calculated that more than 600,000 soldiers would be needed to seize Tehran alone.
What does the force deployment say?
The US military presence in the region has reached a level not seen since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Roughly 50,000 American troops are currently in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Three separate Marine Expeditionary Units are moving towards the region, and a Marine reinforcement of 5,000 to 7,000 in total is expected. The amphibious assault ships carrying these units are equipped with F-35Bs, MV-22 Ospreys, CH-53 heavy transport helicopters and landing craft. In other words, they carry within them everything needed for a coastal landing.
The Airborne Division has cancelled its scheduled exercise and gone on alert, and three carrier strike groups and more than 150 combat aircraft are deployed in the region. What is striking is that A-10 close air support aircraft and Apache attack helicopters have also been dispatched. These platforms are designed primarily to provide fire support to units in contact with ground forces. Their deployment can be read as an indication of serious preparation for a ground operation.
Strategic consequences and risks
Although the risk profiles of these three scenarios differ, the weakness they all share is that none of them has a defined exit strategy behind it.
The Kharg scenario looks reasonable at first glance as an instrument of economic pressure. Seizing the island might take a few days. The real problem is holding it. As noted above, a garrison only 25 kilometres off the Iranian mainland would be permanently exposed to ballistic missiles, drones and artillery fire. That distance is wholly inadequate in terms of defensive depth. More critically, Iran has the capacity to reduce the island’s economic value to zero by shutting down its pipelines. From that point on, the United States would be obliged to defend a piece of land that had lost its strategic meaning, purely out of concern for prestige.
The Hormuz coastal operation is the most coherent scenario in military terms. Reopening the strait is a concrete and measurable objective, but operations of this kind carry an inherent tendency to expand. Clearing the coastal strip requires holding the cleared area. Holding it in turn makes securing the logistics lines imperative. Each step imposes the next, and the boundaries of the operation become blurred. Iran’s “Mosaic Defense Doctrine” is designed precisely to exploit this dynamic.
The Isfahan scenario stands at the far end of the gain-risk balance. Seizing the uranium could permanently prevent nuclear weaponization. In that sense its strategic return is very high. But the success of the operation depends on precise intelligence, and even the IAEA has been unable to verify the material’s exact location for roughly nine months. Reaching tunnels under rubble requires heavy engineering equipment and prolonged work on the ground. Throughout that period the forces would remain in Iran’s interior, in mountainous terrain, with extended logistics lines and in an extremely fragile position.
A structural obstacle that transcends all three scenarios is geography. Although in 2003 US armoured columns reached Baghdad in 21 days across Iraq’s flat desert terrain, such an advance is physically impossible in Iran. The Zagros and Alborz ranges cover half the country’s territory. The major population centres lie in the interior, ringed by mountains and buffered by deserts. From the west, only narrow passes permit passage; from the south, landing areas are limited and covered by layered defences; and from the east, infrastructureless desert makes any logistical planning impossible.
The decision window and the political equation
Trump’s messaging contains a deliberate ambiguity. On 19 March he said “I am not sending troops,” and the following day deployed 2,500 additional Marines. The same day he spoke on Truth Social of “slowing down” operations. In an interview with CNBC he said: “If we pulled out now it would take them at least ten years to rebuild, but they would rebuild. If we stay longer they will never be able to rebuild.” That single sentence sums up the tension between short-term withdrawal and long-term engagement.
The domestic political equation is complicated. According to a Quinnipiac poll, 74 percent of voters oppose sending ground forces. Even among Republicans that figure reaches 52 percent. Congress has to date passed no Authorization for Use of Military Force. Allied support is all but non-existent. NATO allies formally refused to take part in the Hormuz operation on 16 March. In 2003 Britain was at least a significant combat partner. This time the United States and Israel are effectively alone.
A supplementary budget request of 200 billion dollars and daily expenditure of roughly 891 million dollars are steadily increasing the political pressure. That pressure will push either towards a rapid resolution through a determined ground operation or towards early withdrawal before the objectives are met.
In sum, the debate in Washington is no longer focused on whether a ground operation will take place but on its scope and timing. The force deployment timetable pointing to early April makes that possibility more concrete. Yet none of the options on the table appears low-risk. Kharg Island amounts to a forward base of limited sustainability, while an operation along the Hormuz coast could easily lead to an uncontrolled expansion. Isfahan, for its part, stands out as a high-risk target because of intelligence uncertainty.
This picture is directly connected to Iran’s defence architecture. The “Mosaic Defense” approach is a model that envisages local and autonomous elements stepping in even if the central structure is weakened. Mountainous geography and dispersed deployment provide fertile ground for limited ground operations to evolve into a rapidly expanding and unpredictable conflict.
The United States may have the capacity to conduct a limited ground operation, but the question is whether the likely gain from such an operation is worth the cost of escalation, prolonged engagement and Iran’s defence networks. Historical experience shows that interventions beginning with limited objectives can expand rapidly and that costs can exceed what was projected.
This article was first published in IRAM on March 24, 2026.
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