Intense protests over water shortages and power cuts have been taking place in Khuzestan since July 15. Roads have been blocked and people killed, with extensive social media coverage. Officials have announced three deaths so far. Although demonstrations and public anger have not entirely subsided, their intensity has diminished since the first day. Numerous problems still await resolution. If solutions are delayed further, new and perhaps more intense protests can be expected.
Khuzestan, in western Iran at the head of the Persian Gulf and bordering Iraq, is frequently associated with drought, power cuts, and sandstorms, but is rich in both underground and surface resources. It lies within the Fertile Crescent and has fertile farmland. It holds 80 percent of Iran’s onshore oil reserves and 57 percent of its total reserves, and is a well-watered region. Alongside the Karun, Iran’s only river navigable for shipping and therefore commerce, it has numerous rivers, ponds, water sources, and marshes.
Today’s problems are multilayered, arising from many interacting factors. Reducing events to water shortages and electricity cuts oversimplifies the issue and overlooks the dynamics of protests that have occurred on varying scales for several years. Public anger can be understood only by considering these layers together: climate change, misguided water and agricultural policies, industrial pollution of freshwater, oil companies’ damage to fertile land, ethnic sensitivities, the growth of deprived urban settlements, and accompanying unemployment and security problems.
From the 1960s, domestic and global demand led Khuzestan to emphasize and substantially expand sugarcane production. Sugarcane consumes large quantities of water. Excessive irrigation caused fertile soils to lose productivity, increasing salinity until land became unusable. Approximately 70,000 hectares are planted with sugarcane. Harvesting through controlled burning causes serious air, soil, and water pollution, and officials are seeking alternatives. The state-owned Khuzestan Water and Power Organization has repeatedly issued warnings. Academic studies also examine the long-term soil damage caused by continuous sugarcane cultivation on the same land. There is also commentary suggesting that the techniques and technology used by Chinese companies arriving particularly under Ahmadinejad to explore for and extract oil seriously damaged the region’s water and soil.
Sugarcane cultivation has another adverse effect. As an ancient settlement area, Khuzestan contains numerous important archaeological sites. Haft Tappeh, an area prominent in sugarcane production, is one. After it was opened to and developed for cultivation, archaeological remains suffered serious damage.
Changes to riverbeds, unplanned channels, numerous dams, and diversion of water to address shortages in provinces such as Isfahan and Qom have dried up many Khuzestan waterways. Water sources increasingly salinized by poor irrigation and farming have harmed livestock and wildlife, causing mass deaths of wild animals. Shadegan, Iran’s largest and the world’s twelfth-largest wetland, home to many species, has fallen victim to industrial waste, particularly from the sugar industry, and has begun disappearing through continual degradation. This has badly affected animal husbandry, particularly water buffalo, which depend on water and are important locally. Destruction of wildlife has also harmed hunting, another significant part of the local economy.
Climate change already harms many countries and water resources; Khuzestan has naturally been affected. Beyond climate-related difficulties, waste from steel, oil, and sugar industries seriously pollutes water and renders drinking supplies unusable. Climate and environmental damage have depleted potable sources so rapidly that researchers are working on devices to turn atmospheric moisture into drinking water in this normally water-rich region.
All this economic destruction has also severely damaged the region’s social balance. Its greatest sociological problem today is the growth of deprived urban settlements. Economic imbalances and other factors have displaced a large population in recent years, opening the way to social instability. Problems emerging and deepening through these mass movements feed public anger. İRAM’s January 2021 analysis “Huzistan’da Varoşlaşma: Sorunlar ve Sonuçlar” examined the issue and discussed its social and economic effects in detail.
Although protests began over water and power cuts, reactions, especially on social media, have shifted toward allegations of government ethnic discrimination in this predominantly Arab area. A narrative has emerged that officials deliberately create hardship to force migration and Persianize the region. Alongside commentary on Khuzestan, some Iranian Turks joined in through “We stand with you, Al-Ahwaz” hashtags, expressing support in ethnically inflected, generally English-language tweets. Parallels have occasionally been drawn with events over Lake Urmia’s drying. Although brief solidarity protests occurred in Tehran’s metro, the demonstrations have remained regional rather than spreading nationwide.
Khuzestan now faces numerous problems whose resolution can no longer be postponed. Revising its deeply established industrial structure and building a new system will not be easy. Iran is already in a profound economic crisis, and radical steps to address problems caused by entrenched industries in one of its most important economic pillars appear unlikely.
Meetings and discussions have continued for some time, with requests for allocations from the 1401 budget to address long-term needs. Mojtaba Yousefi, representing Ahvaz, said he had met Ghalibaf, who promised personal attention to the issue. Yet however urgent the provision of a basic necessity such as water may be, Khuzestan’s problems cannot be solved quickly. They are among the issues requiring an urgent response from Raisi when he assumes office in August.
As economic problems, urban deprivation, ecological damage, and their consequences remain unresolved, protests will continue and intensify, and ethnic separatist rhetoric will increasingly come to the fore. Senior politicians visited after earlier disasters and made promises that were not fulfilled. This may undermine public trust in government.
This article was first published by the Center for Iranian Studies (İRAM) on July 21, 2021.
Link: https://www.iramcenter.org/huzistan-protestolarinin-arka-plani-548