A New Wave on the Iran-Israel Line: Where Is the War Heading?
Although the first exchange of missile fire seen since the ceasefire of 8 April between Iran and the United States/Israel has prompted thoughts that the war has resumed, reading the development as a reignition of the war may be misleading. The picture is nonetheless not without risk. After Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel and Israel struck Hezbollah targets in Beirut, Iran treated the attack as a violation of a red line, on the argument that the ceasefire also covers Lebanon, and responded with missiles. Yet every stage remained measured, the strike was kept limited, and US President Donald Trump called on both sides to stop within the first hour.
Why does the ceasefire matter to the parties?
At the point now reached, the ceasefire matters to both the United States and Iran. Although Iran appears to have forced its adversary to the table by holding out in conventional war, it is trying to keep afloat, under siege, an economy whose infrastructure has been largely destroyed, whose refineries have been struck and whose daily life has been disrupted. The longer the war lasts, the heavier the burden becomes, and uncertainty prevents reconstruction. Iran’s real test therefore lies not at the front but in managing the economic and social crisis produced by the destruction. For if the electricity grid and oil infrastructure, protected so far, are targeted, the cost will rise beyond comparison. For Tehran, then, an agreement is not a preference but a necessity. Yet at a point where it sees itself as holding the advantage, it will not approach such an agreement without securing certain gains.
This need should not be read as submission. In the twelve days of fighting in June 2025 and despite the killing on 28 February of most of the leadership, including Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei, the system did not collapse and the administration regrouped around Mojtaba Khamenei. His influence over the Revolutionary Guards, his experience of government and his political connections make him a figure who can both hold the system together and, for that very reason, be seen as a critical target.
Despite decapitation and heavy destruction, the system that has remained standing perceives the present situation as existential and appears ready to bear high costs. Tehran, therefore, even while needing an economic accommodation, will not approach an agreement that gives the appearance of submission. Indeed, the essential message behind the strikes of 7 June points in that direction.
Washington’s position is also harder than it appears. The Strait of Hormuz, closed since the end of February, has suppressed the flow of oil, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) has counted this among the largest supply disruptions in history. Rising prices are fuelling inflation and threatening growth. Moreover, the operation’s real objective, regime change, has not been achieved, and forcing the strait open has ceased to be an option. Washington cannot carry this burden indefinitely. In short, only an agreement can open the strait. And since that is Iran’s most effective card, Tehran will not want to open the strait without extracting concessions and guarantees.
The parties have indeed been working on such an agreement for some time. A basis of understanding is on the table that would extend the ceasefire by sixty days and is built around the reopening of Hormuz and a reduction in energy prices. In return Iran expects an easing of sanctions and resources for its destroyed infrastructure. What really blocks the negotiation, however, is the nuclear programme. While Washington insists on zero enrichment, Tehran is not giving up that right, and a comprehensive settlement is being deferred.
Tehran’s message
This is what makes Iran’s move of 7 June meaningful. With a single move Tehran sent a message to both Israel and the United States and, taking the violation of the red line it had drawn for Lebanon as an opportunity, showed what it could do if there were a return to war. In doing so it demonstrates that it has not left Hezbollah alone and is standing behind the Lebanese front; it charges Israel with the step that emptied out the ceasefire, deepening the rift between Trump and Netanyahu; and it recalls that if negotiations collapse, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait will be next. The common implication of these messages is that the cost of a prolonged war will not be confined to Iran but will be felt in the global economy as well. Indeed, the Houthis’ repetition in the same period of their threat to target Israeli shipping in the Red Sea gives the impression of coordination at the level of messaging within the Iranian axis. With Hormuz closed, the only element restraining global prices is the flow of Saudi oil through the Red Sea. If Bab el-Mandeb closes too, the collapse of that line becomes possible. Iran is thus recalling that, if the siege continues, it can widen the war and multiply the cost.
A lasting ceasefire requires Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon
The northern leg of the equation is Lebanon, and the issue is not only Hezbollah. That Israel, with the ground operation launched in March, has crossed the Litani and controls roughly a fifth of the country is the field application of the “defensible Israeli borders” doctrine that had remained on paper for years. The emptying of villages and the prevention of resettlement suggest that this is a permanent occupation. Since Iran ties the ceasefire to Israel’s withdrawal, the Litani line is a critical threshold for Tehran as well. For that reason, even if agreement is reached on Hormuz and the nuclear file, Lebanon will remain a live trigger.
In sum, Iran wants to avoid a second wave from the United States that would target civilian infrastructure, while the United States wants to resolve Hormuz and the nuclear question without making the war more costly. Yet this path is not guaranteed for either side. Just as worsening deprivation may at some point trigger a major social explosion, it may equally entrench the regime by centralizing the security apparatus and feeding the nationalist reflex. Since both sides need a narrative of victory, it appears difficult to emerge from this impasse without giving the appearance of defeat.
It is also likely that Israeli security circles read this fragility as a window of opportunity and continue sabotage and influence operations even if the ceasefire formally holds. For it is not out of the question that an Iran which has deterred its adversaries and perhaps emerged with certain gains will return in future to the activities that were the cause of war. In the Israeli perspective, therefore, the tendency is strengthening that what is required is not the temporary deterrence of Iran but the long-term breaking of its military, economic and technological capacity. But neither global markets nor the United States nor the Gulf states can bear such a cost. This picture has the potential to feed the tension between Netanyahu’s ambitions and Trump’s constraints. For in domestic political terms Netanyahu wants to leave office not as a prime minister who “committed corruption” and is a “perpetrator of genocide” but as a leader who “secured Israel’s safety” and “removed the Iranian threat,” and that expectation conflicts with Trump’s effort to reach an agreement as soon as possible.
This article was first published in Anadolu Agency on June 10, 2026.
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