Although Iran could see what Israel was trying to do, it considered how to respond within its capabilities. It was seeking an “honorable way out,” and achieved one by making clear that it would retaliate but had absolutely no desire to start a war. That was precisely what Israel wanted.
Illustration: Cemile Ağaç Yıldırım.
The long-running tension between Iran and Israel entered a new phase following the attack a few nights ago. For the first time in the Islamic Republic’s history, Iran launched an overt, direct attack on Israel. Having raised expectations considerably beforehand, Iran found its capabilities questioned when the attack proved less impressive and less forceful than promised. Yet this is not a particularly sound way to understand the issue’s essence. It should be read as a political maneuver rather than a military operation, remembering that every military action pursues a political objective. Militarily, Iran did not “fail to strike”; it “chose not to strike.” Politically, however, and for other reasons I will explain below, it “could not strike.” It did not undertake a full-capacity military operation. Even the proxies Iran has built can breach Israel’s air defenses and strike its cities with missiles made using relatively inferior technology. To say that Iran, which supplied them with that technology and possesses far more advanced systems, “could not hit” Israel overlooks realities on the ground. Politically, however, it could not use that technology. Possessing a weapon does not mean being able to use it under every circumstance.
TEHRAN WILL AVOID WAR
Why did Iran not attack at full capacity? Because its people and rulers know very well what war means from the eight-year war with Iraq. You may start a war, but its dynamics determine when it ends. Even the Iraq war was brought to an end only with great difficulty. Iranians know all too well what it means to lose lives and have critical infrastructure destroyed. Since the 1990s, figures such as Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Rouhani have built Iran’s critical infrastructure while struggling with immense difficulties, numerous embargoes, and sanctions. They even likened rebuilding the country to a “jihad,” calling it Jihad-e Sazandegi, or “construction jihad.” In other words, Iranians cannot risk seeing what they painstakingly built over 30 years razed by a week of Israeli and Western attacks. In recent years, some Iranian cities have been unable to receive electricity and water, particularly in summer, and have experienced lengthy outages. These provoke protests, as in Khuzestan in 2021. With such problems even in peacetime, war is simply not a risk Iran can afford. It could therefore strike Israel militarily, but could not do so politically.
Understanding this vulnerability well, Israel deliberately and forcibly drew Iran into the confrontation. Iran found itself facing a fait accompli. Israeli intelligence was surely aware of every move made by someone as important as Mohammad Reza Zahedi. Nor was Israel unaware of who entered and left Iran’s embassy in Syria. It is not difficult to imagine that Israel possessed this information in minute detail. Killing such an important figure in a building immediately beside the embassy served a particular purpose. Israel both eliminated a man directing the proxy forces fighting it and drew Iran into a direct confrontation with no way out.
SEEKING AN “HONORABLE WAY OUT”
At that point, Iran had been left no choice. Although it saw what Israel was trying to do, it considered how it could respond within its capabilities. During this period, the public saw plenty of animations and graphic design. Meanwhile, Iranians, led by the press, repeatedly told their domestic audience that “Israel is trying to divert attention from Gaza and escape charges of genocide by widening the conflict into a US–Iran confrontation.” Intense diplomacy took place between Iran and the countries involved in the region. Iran’s foreign minister held telephone calls with many countries before the attack. Although the Iranian press presented this as “the world trying to protect Israel from Iran’s wrath,” it can be said that Iran was really informing the parties concerned that it did not want all-out war but would respond because it had to. Information appearing in various open sources points in the same direction. Iran, then, was seeking an “honorable way out,” and achieved one by stating that it would retaliate but had absolutely no wish to start a war. That was also what Israel wanted.
Events on the night of the attack reinforce this argument. Jordan, for example, issued a NOTAM for only a few hours and closed its airspace for that period, rather than until further notice. Israeli officials also adopted a measured approach. Had they expected a severe attack, their language would have been very different. Schools were closed briefly, and the IDF announced the following night that restrictions were being lifted. This is one indication that Israel will not retaliate with a direct military attack. Thus, after being placed in a difficult position by Israel, Iran somehow found its “honorable way out.” Celebrations are now taking place in Iranian streets, and a mood of victory is being promoted across every platform.
The attack also provided the parties with considerable data. In effect, it amounted to a war game. Which radars detected the drones and missiles, where they were intercepted, and which countries intercepted them were all recorded individually, particularly by Iran. After all, Iran does not have the chance to attack Israel directly and test its weapons systems every day.
NETANYAHU SEEKS VICTIMHOOD
As noted above, the target, location, and timing of the embassy attack in Syria were not chosen by chance. It was designed to bring Israel into direct confrontation with Iran rather than its proxies. Israel has fought those proxies for years. Since October 7, it has continued to face attacks from them, particularly the Houthis. Yet none of this fully established an Israel–Iran confrontation in the eyes of world opinion; attention remained on Gaza. The strike in Syria directly targeted the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It killed a senior, experienced figure who organized proxy attacks on Israel—also sending that message to Iran—left Iran no option but to attack, and sought to divert attention from Gaza by creating a new narrative around the “Iranian threat.”
Israel is known to have suffered a serious loss of standing in the West over Gaza, with its image as “genocidal” increasingly taking hold. The moment news emerged that drones had taken off, a social media campaign began under the heading “Israel under attack,” bringing Israeli victimhood back onto the agenda. One political objective was thus achieved. Time will tell whether these campaigns prove effective. If attention remains on Gaza, the effort will have been in vain.
Netanyahu’s domestic political predicament is also well known. These events put pressure on and silence opponents within Israel. Yet it would be unrealistic to claim that an entire nation was endangered simply because Netanyahu was in difficulty. All of this is tantamount to playing with fire. The issue has many layers, including a US domestic political dimension. At a time when Trump’s return to power is being discussed, the Biden administration has demonstrated before the elections that it stands at least as firmly with Israel. By saying it would not participate in an attack on Iran, however, the United States also made sure to draw a line for both Iran and Israel.
Shortly before the attack, some sources interviewed inside Israel explicitly said: “What is Iran going to do—fire more missiles than Hamas?” They indicated that Iran’s threats were not being taken seriously. In other words, from the moment Iran announced it would attack, there was little upheaval inside Israel. After October 7, villages near the Lebanese border had emptied for fear of a possible Hezbollah attack. Their residents have now returned. Villages emptied by the fear “Will Hezbollah attack too?” after October 7 have thus remained unaffected by Iran’s threats, which have not led residents to think Hezbollah will act. This is another indication that the Israeli public does not take Iran’s threats particularly seriously.
There is, however, another side to the coin. Rather than striking a diplomatic mission in kind, Iran escalated by attacking inside Israel itself. This caused unease in some Israeli circles over Israel’s deterrence. A direct Israeli attack on Iran is therefore not entirely out of the question. It is too early to reach a definitive judgment.
TEL AVIV GOT WHAT IT WANTED
Ultimately, Israel achieved its political aim: Iran attacked. Whether the attack was effective is a separate matter entirely. The Israeli government will now try to wash the blood from its hands by saying: “Iran is a threat—look, it attacked us. Israel’s security matters. We must protect Israel.” Netanyahu has been active in Israeli politics for nearly 30 years, and his brother is also a national hero, making him a powerful figure within Israel. These events allowed him to escape trial and punishment. Before October 7, tens of thousands were demanding his resignation in the streets; today, Israelis have a very different agenda. In short, everything that has happened has benefited the current Israeli government enormously. The United States, too, demonstrated the support expected for Israel ahead of the approaching elections and emphasized the importance of defending it.
Iran, meanwhile, was probably forced into the confrontation and calculated—perhaps in consultation with various countries—how to respond with the least damage while preserving national honor. The attack a few nights ago followed. Although Israel says it will respond, the military doctrines of both countries prioritize avoiding open war. This confrontation will therefore subside and resume in arenas such as Syria.
GAZA MUST REMAIN THE SOLE PRIORITY
After events in Gaza, Israel too needs a way out of its predicament. It may use the Iranian threat as a justification to its domestic audience for moving toward a cease-fire. Yet if Gaza’s people and their suffering are forgotten amid all this noise, or if events there become normalized, Israel will have achieved its fundamental strategic objective. This point requires particular attention and care. Every state sincere about Gaza must quickly move this attack off the agenda and focus on the real issue: Palestine. Otherwise, Israel’s “hawks” will get what they want, and events in Gaza will fade from view amid these other issues.
This article was first published in Yeni Şafak on April 17, 2024.
Link: https://www.yenisafak.com/dusunce-gunlugu/iranin-israile-saldirisinin-hedefi-neydi-4615361