Anatomy of Iran's Attacks on Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan

The Impact of the Kerman Attack on Iranian Public Opinion and its Consequences

The recent attack in Kerman, which occurred on the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, has had a profound impact on Iranian public opinion. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps released a statement suggesting that the attack aimed to create a sense of insecurity in the country. During the funeral ceremony, Ebrahim Raisi stated that their forces would determine the time and place of retaliation, indicating that they hold the initiative. He also made it clear that this attack would not go unanswered.

It is important to note that the attack was not a common occurrence in Iran. The collective social anger that followed the attack caused significant unrest throughout the country. The initial allegations that the attackers were Afghans brought the refugee issue, which was already a sensitive topic in Iran, to the forefront and created an atmosphere that could incite violence against Afghans. In response, Iranian media and government officials quickly responded to the situation by using various crisis management and public diplomacy techniques to calm public anger and prevent potential incidents. The claim that the attackers were Afghans was quickly denied. Newspaper articles were published describing “the brotherhood between Iran and Afghanistan”, “how they acted together in Syria”, and “Qasem Soleimani's appreciation for the capabilities of Afghan fighters”. However, the Iranian press still criticized our migration policy, labeling it as problematic. In the week following the attack, the moderate and reformist press published articles criticizing the issue of irregular migration. As the Iranian authorities, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Intelligence, shared details about the attackers, the issue lost its intensity, and the danger was averted.

Although the danger that emerged in the first days of the attack was averted, public criticism persisted. Several articles in the press claimed that 'strategic patience has come to an end' and that 'action must be taken, otherwise the enemy will be emboldened.' An article titled 'Security cannot be ensured by talking' was published in the newspaper Jomhouri-ye Eslami five days after the attack (January 7). The article suggests that law enforcement and intelligence units should be strengthened first, and then those who were negligent in the incident should be punished without protection. In the last part of the article, it is stated that "One of the problems of our country is that no one is guilty in any incident! When there is insecurity or a major terrorist crime like Kerman, everyone starts shouting slogans and making speeches, and all attention turns to the enemy." As a result, public pressure in Iran has reached its peak following the attack.

The Messages of the Attacks in Syria and Iraq

On January 15, Iran carried out strikes in Syria and Iraq, which were explained by the IRGC as a response to Iran's enemies. According to IRGC Air Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the Syrian strike was in response to the Kerman attack, and the Iraqi strike was in revenge for the killing of two IRGC members in Syria. According to Hajizadeh, the target struck in northern Iraq was a robust concrete bunker utilized for espionage and special operations in Iran. The structure and the technological devices in the bunker two floors below it, were destroyed as a result of the attack.

As previously explained and extensively covered in the press, Iran carried out these attacks to demonstrate its determination for revenge. The language used in the attacks strongly emphasized this point, targeting both DAESH and Mossad. Additionally, the attacks served as a demonstration of Iran's ballistic missile capacity, which is a well-known fact. However, in the past, there have been doubts about Iran's missile capacity and its ability to deter due to the low accuracy of its missiles in some attempts. Iran has demonstrated the range of its weapons by hitting certain points in Syria, which includes the ability to reach Israel. It is noteworthy that the missile with this range was named 'Kheibar Shekan' in reference to the Battle of Kheibar. On the other hand, while the execution of these attacks near the Turkish border is interpreted by some analysts as a message to Turkey, it is important to understand that the message conveyed by these attacks is not directed solely at Turkey, but rather at all powers in the region.

With the attack on Iraq, Iran has ostensibly showcased its intelligence capabilities. However, the evidence suggesting that the targeted site had a connection to Mossad is not strong. Furthermore, it has been revealed that some photos publishedin the Iranian media were later found to be photoshopped. Nevertheless, Iranian authorities persistently uphold these claims. On the other hand, according to some analysts, Arbil is one of the easiest targets for Iran, and with this attack, Iran is conveying a message of 'We have avenged Mossad' to its domestic audience while also sending a message to Northern Iraq. Lastly, Iran may have intended to demonstrate the accuracy of its missiles.

However, for Iran, another significant aspect of both attacks is the message conveyed to its domestic audience. Parliamentary elections are approaching in Iran in about one and a half months, and there is a high probability of low voter turnout. For nearly a year, strategies to increase election participation have been sought in Iran. A low turnout election would present a vulnerability in terms of the legitimacy of the ruling power, leading to high-level calls for participation in Iran. So much so that last week, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei requested Friday Imams to call for increased participation. The Kerman attack, as a major assault, leaving it unanswered is a critical matter for Iran, as it is essential to maintain the public's trust in the government and the state.

Message of the Pakistan Attack

Within the dynamics of the region, such attacks have become so commonplace that almost no one was surprised by Iran's operations in the failed states such as Iraq and Syria. However, what was truly surprising was the move against elements within Pakistani territory in the early hours of the following day. While there were no significant issues in Iran-Pakistan relations, Iran's violation of Pakistan's sovereignty in this attack surprised the international community. The world's attention was drawn to this event, not just because Pakistan is a nuclear power, but also due to its frequent emphasis on sovereignty concerns, especially in relation to the India issue.

Iran's struggle with Baloch separatists has been an ongoing issue for decades, and apart from minor incidents, there has been no activity that would violate Pakistan's sovereignty to such an extent in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, from the moment the attack took place, Iranian officials at every level have been conveying the message that "there is no problem with Pakistan". Similarly, since that day, the Iranian press has been publishing articles emphasizing that there are no issues between Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan’s response to strike back at Iran and the Iranian authorities' statement that "those killed were not Iranian citizens" to close the matter indicate a desire on the part of Iran to quickly de-escalate the tension.

What was the objective of this assault then? It is apparent that this attack must be analyzed in conjunction with the other two. Assessing the Pakistan attack solely within the context of the upcoming elections and the increasingly brittle social fabric, a result of years of civil unrest, would be an incomplete interpretation. In truth, with this assault, Iran sought to demonstrate to both its internal and external public its determination and the kind of risks it is willing to take when necessary.

During a time marked by direct threatening statements against Iran due to the activities of the Ansarullah forces in Bab al-Mandeb, and frequent discussions of regional warfare since the Operation Aqsa Storm, Iran has aimed to demonstrate its missile capabilities, intelligence capacities, and level of resolve through distinct operations, intending to send messages to actors in the region. Additionally, it has used this as a tool to alleviate the pressure in its domestic politics, employing the 'revenge has been taken' message to soothe the rising public discontent.  However, the approach demonstrated by Iran following the strike on Pakistan, and the air attack on Damascus on January 20th, in which five high-ranking members of the Iranian security forces were killed, has significantly diminished the impact of these maneuvers.