A new alternative for Greece: Iran's Kamikaze Drones
- Oral Toğa
- Dec 24, 2023
- 5 min read
Turkey's advances in the defense industry are undoubtedly being closely followed by the Greek public. Each step becomes the subject of lengthy discussions and detailed analysis in the Greek media and academia. The decisive role of Turkish defense industry products in the conflicts in Libya, Karabakh and Ukraine has prompted Greece, which already perceives threats from Turkey, to seek new alternatives. The role of Turkish UAV/drone technology in these conflict zones, as well as in counter-terrorism and cross-border operations, is high on Greece's agenda. In this context, Greece has been exploring alternatives for self-defense and security. These searches are mainly proceeding in two directions: the development of defense technology to counter Turkish UAVs/drones and the possession of indigenous Greek UAVs/drones. Efforts have been made to install anti-drone systems in strategic locations throughout the country, especially on the islands. In this direction, Greece has entered into bilateral cooperation with Israel, focusing on the Drone Dome system developed by the Israeli company Rafael. Although the primary goal is to neutralize Turkish UAVs/drones by using laser and electronic systems, the detection range of the system, as stated in the Rafael brochure, is 3,500 km, which is far below the altitude of Turkish UAVs/drones. Moreover, the leaking of this "confidential" information to the press has sparked separate debates in Greece.
Secondly, Greece's ambitions to produce its own UAVs/drones have been frequently reported in the media. One such example is the Arhitas project, introduced under the headline "The first Greek unmanned aerial vehicle that frightens the Turks is ready", which was also reported in the Turkish press. The completion of the second quarter of the project, a collaboration between the Greek aviation industry and three universities - the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, the University of Thessaly and the Democritus University of Thrace - was announced by Greek Finance Minister Christos Staikouras. Work will continue on the vehicle, which is scheduled to make its maiden flight in March 2024.
Despite numerous similar UAV/drone production and defense news stories constantly appearing in the Greek media, many aspects of these reports appear to be strategically orchestrated for public relations purposes aimed at boosting morale against the Turkish defense industry. For example, the news about Altus, the company founded by Zaharis Sarris, portrayed Sarris as someone who "works against every Greek who mocks the cliché that 'Greece can't produce anything' by designing, working and creating state-of-the-art products." During the leak of the aforementioned "confidential" information, opinions surfaced suggesting that these leaks were intentionally made to reassure the public. In addition, the portrayal of the Arhitas project as "the first Greek unmanned aerial vehicle that scares the Turks" has become a subject of ridicule in the Turkish media.
In the midst of these discussions, the effectiveness of Iran's Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, tested in the Russia-Ukraine war, has not escaped the attention of Greek media and academia. In recent weeks, Greek defense and security texts have increasingly focused on Iran's defense strategy, seeing Iran's asymmetric approach as a potential alternative for Greece. For example, an article in Pentapostagma envisioned a scenario in which Greek UAVs/drones would attack Turkish marines approaching one of the Greek islands, predicting devastating results in terms of both casualties and morale for the aggressor Turks. The same article notes that the Russian-Ukrainian war offers many lessons for a potential Turkish-Greek conflict, emphasizing that Greece, with its numerous islands in the Aegean, must have a large arsenal of precise and lethal weapons systems to counter Turkish aggression. Kamikaze drones are suggested as an excellent alternative due to their low production costs, short operator training requirements, and suitability for defending civilian populations in the Aegean. It was stated that these drones could enable anyone between the ages of 15 and 65, especially on the islands, to disable or kill Turkish special forces with a single strike. It was also mentioned that these drones could target both military and non-military targets along the Anatolian coast.
Another article in the Greek media claimed that Turkey's "unregulated drone production" could open doors for terrorist organizations. It reported extensively on Iran's use of kamikaze drones to target U.S. bases in Iraq, and also mentioned "Iranian-style" attacks carried out by "Turkish-backed" Hamas in May. The success of Iran's kamikaze drones raised concerns that similar doors were opening for Turkey, with the article speculating that many targets in Greece could be hit under the guise of terrorism, but known to be carried out by Turkey. It was claimed that "gangs that massacred Greeks in Anatolia 100 years ago could be transformed into super-armed gangs capable of hitting targets inside Greece, and Greeks would find themselves in a nightmare reality where no amount of Rafael purchases could counter these attacks".
One of the most interesting analyses in the Greek media appeared in Ptisi, written by Christos Ktenas. The article primarily debated whether it was possible for Greece to produce an equivalent to Iran's Shahed-136. Central to the discussion was the question, "Why can't Greece do the same when Iran, under an international arms embargo and deprived of many critical technologies, can produce not only the Shahed-136 but also dozens of other unmanned models? The simplicity and affordability of the Shahed-136 was emphasized, described as a "primitive" drone without complex algorithms or even user communication, whose impact on the battlefield is nevertheless significant. It was noted that despite its vulnerability and low altitude, made of materials that leave a small radar signature, Shahed-136 could slip through gaps in air defense systems that do not cover every point and every city. The article argued that Greece should consider this new situation as an alternative, even though it has projects like Arhitas and LOTUS. It was suggested that Greece already has the technological know-how, as Iran did not make a giant leap, but rather synthesized existing technology at a reasonable cost. The article advocated drones that do not require special durability, long-term storage facilities, or long-term use, which could be advantageous for Greece.
This approach could be interpreted as the first signs that Greece might emulate Iran's decades-long strategy of asymmetrical defense against Turkey. While Greece intensifies efforts on UAV/Drone projects like Arhitas and LOTUS and collaborates on Israel's Drone Dome to strengthen its defense against Turkey, it's unlikely that Greece, being a NATO member, would directly purchase weapons from Iran. However, under wartime conditions, this could change rapidly. A technology transfer collaboration with Iran, rather than direct arms purchases, is a viable option. Yet, the feasibility of such collaboration requires investigation and monitoring. Weakened against Turkey in several areas, including the Karabakh issue, Iran might seek to enter such a partnership with Greece to distract and strengthen its position against Turkey. However, considering Greece's ongoing efforts to collaborate with Gulf countries, the air defense systems sent to Saudi Arabia, and the recent tanker crisis between the two countries, such a partnership seems unlikely at this stage but is not impossible. Moreover, without explicit approval from the U.S. and the EU, such a collaboration with Iran is unlikely for Greece. Hence, the question "Can we make it?" rather than "Can we get it?" is more relevant. Nonetheless, it can be said that Greece has been closely monitoring Iran's asymmetric weapons capabilities and activities, especially following the Ukraine War.
This article was first published in Turkish on 06.12.2022 by the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM).
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