Recently, Mossad abducted Yadollah Khedmati inside Iran. He is the deputy to Brigadier General Ali Asghar Nowruzi, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) official responsible for shipping arms and money to Iran’s proxies in the Middle East and the region. Nowruzi is a pivotal figure for the IRGC and its regional activities. A close friend of Qasem Soleimani, he is also among the most important figures in Iran’s supply operations. He sits on the board of the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, or Bonyad-e Taavon-e Sepah, established on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s orders to transfer money from the national budget to the Quds Force and fund its activities. Because of Nowruzi’s power, influence, and ability to ship weapons covertly, his operating method became known within the IRGC as the “Nowruzi Mechanism.” The abduction of Khedmati, deputy to Nowruzi, who has been active since 2019, is significant in this context.
According to sources, during his abduction Khedmati provided information about how supplies were delivered to all the militia groups and proxies linked to Iran in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, particularly Hezbollah. His interrogation reportedly lasted several hours, after which he was released unharmed at an unknown place and time. The abduction and its aftermath offer important clues about Mossad’s activities inside Iran. On June 14, Iranian state television broadcast a report about Mossad, describing a group of Iranians recruited by an operative codenamed Sirius. The group had received training for activities in Iran ranging from sabotage to abduction. The report called them “arazel o obash,” meaning thugs or bandits. The operative contacted recruits through social media, trained them online, and paid them in dollars. According to state television, they had abducted an IRGC member, though he was not named. Only a few images, reportedly retrieved from the group’s phones, were released. The report alleged that the abducted man had been questioned on matters outside his expertise or involvement and forced to confess through “torture and coercion.” The report said the recruits and the Mossad operative were apprehended by IRGC Intelligence with help from the Ministry of Intelligence. Following their capture, an image appeared in the report’s abduction segment, but the victim’s identity was not disclosed. Later, however, the Saudi-funded, London-based Iran International said it had obtained a video of Khedmati. It released only a short excerpt rather than the full recording. This revealed that the man in the state television images was Khedmati. The intelligence operative appears to have conducted the interrogation online. Indeed, available source information suggests that Sirius maintains his contacts online as much as possible.
The released portion of the video translates as follows:
“I am Yadollah Khedmati, son of ... [father’s name inaudible]. I work in Amad [the IRGC Readiness and Support Department], and Mr. Nowruzi is my superior. You said that Mr. Nowruzi handles weapons, armed drones, missiles, and everything else from the IRGC department called Amad to neighboring countries, Hezbollah, and Syria; he arranges their transport. I am in Mr. Nowruzi’s office, and I regret these activities.”
With this footage, Iran had itself already confirmed this high-level Israeli interrogation, undercutting its own position. Close examination of the state television images reveals a phone, one indication that the Israeli operative conducted the interrogation online. The footage leaked to Iran International, meanwhile, appears to have been recorded from that phone. This strengthens the view that it was leaked through Israeli channels.
Left: blurred images broadcast by Iranian state television. Right: the video sent to Iran International.
Khedmati’s admissions also include connections with Fars Air Qeshm Cargo, used for shipments. This airline has been at the center of numerous questionable incidents. One of its pilots, Gholamreza Ghasemi, was questioned in Argentina in May (Khordad) alongside several Iranian officials, and a Boeing 747 belonging to a US-sanctioned Venezuelan holding company was seized. Originally owned by the IRGC-linked Mahan Air, the aircraft had been transferred to Venezuela a year earlier. Ghasemi’s phone contained photographs of missiles and equipment being shipped for operations against Israel. After these IRGC activities became public, officials from its aviation unit warned Nowruzi to suspend his operations, but he refused. Sources say he did not regard the interrogation as serious enough to affect shipment security. They also report, however, that IRGC officials sidelined him from decision-making.
The interrogation and information obtained clearly dealt a serious blow to IRGC arms shipments. Yet this was not the first such incident. On April 30, another IRGC member, Mansour Rasouli, who allegedly planned assassinations targeting Israelis in Germany, France, and Türkiye, was abducted, and interrogation footage leaked to the press. In a later video, he denied the account, saying his abductors were bandits, not Mossad, and that he had spoken under duress. In Khedmati’s case, however, Israel has effectively obtained confirmation through Iranian state television itself.
Another point stands out. For approximately a decade, facilities and individuals connected to Iran’s nuclear program have been disabled or eliminated through sabotage and assassination. These activities have grown more frequent, particularly since Mohsen Fakhrizadeh’s assassination. Over the past three months, numerous mid-ranking and senior IRGC figures, along with others, have died suspiciously or been assassinated, almost once every two days. Many explosions and abductions have also been reported during the same period. Israel’s increased operational capacity inside Iran is now widely recognized. As noted above, it has also undertaken particularly aggressive and “humiliating” actions for some time. Reports frequently suggest it has established a deep, extensive intelligence network. The dismissal of IRGC Intelligence chief Hossein Taeb has been linked to this issue. Senior IRGC figure Ali Nasiri was also reportedly arrested for spying for Israel, while many members of the Defense Ministry’s missile development department were said to have been arrested for leaking military information. Not all these activities directly concern the nuclear program. The abductions, and the targeting of engineers and officials unrelated to nuclear matters, offer further evidence that Israel has diversified its operations under the “Octopus Doctrine,” announced in 2018 by Naftali Bennett, who has served as defense minister and was prime minister in the previous government, and is implementing it successfully.
Taken together, these developments show Israel adopting a much more aggressive approach toward Iran in recent months. This could be interpreted as a sign that Iran is nearing the completion of nuclear weapons development. Other open sources suggest a similar picture. Last year, Iranian officials announced plans to increase uranium enrichment. Last week, Time published an article by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. “In 2018, they were about seventeen months from the threshold of developing nuclear weapons. Today, they are probably seventeen days away,” he wrote, emphasizing the seriousness of the issue. Iranian officials have also switched off surveillance cameras at nuclear facilities and, according to reports last week, said they would remain off until the nuclear agreement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—was restored. It is now difficult to say whether restoring the agreement still matters to Iran. Severe economic sanctions aside, the impasse benefits the progress of its nuclear program.
Israel has clearly been trying for some time to squeeze Iran on multiple fronts inside the country itself, not only over its nuclear program but also its missile work and logistics. Iranian officials also allege that social unrest over the past year and a half was deliberately inflamed by agents of influence. Although it currently seems impossible to prove whether the unrest arose naturally or, as Iranian officials claim, was orchestrated, Israel’s aggression and the other developments together suggest that Iran may be very close to building a nuclear weapon. If events develop in a way that reinforces Israeli concerns and the situation grows more serious, Israel can be expected to undertake much more aggressive and audacious actions.
This article was first published by the Center for Iranian Studies (İRAM) on August 2, 2022.
Link: https://www.iramcenter.org/hidmetinin-sorgulanmasi-ve-son-aylardaki-olaylarin-dusundurdukleri-785