Iran’s Counter-Espionage Law

The 12-day direct conflict between Iran and Israel in June 2025 resulted in consequences that have fundamentally altered not only the regional military and strategic balance but also Iran's internal security paradigm. During this period, Israel conducted targeted assassinations, cyberattacks, and air operations against Iran’s critical military, security, and nuclear infrastructure, achieving an unprecedented level of deep infiltration. The losses sustained and the exposed security vulnerabilities have heightened concerns, particularly among the political elite, regarding enemy intelligence activities supported from within. In this atmosphere, the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran passed the "Law on Aggravating Penalties for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States" (Tarh-e Taşdid-e Mücazat-e Casusân ve Hemkâri-konandegân bâ Rejim-e Sehyonisti ve Keşvarhâ-ye Motehasem) on June 23, 2025 (“Iran moves to”, 2025; “New Iran espionage”, 2025). The law categorizes actions such as engaging in demoralizing rhetoric during wartime, transferring information to enemy media, and providing technological communication support as grave crimes, extending well beyond the mere leaking of military information (“Iran: Concerns over”, 2025).

Scope of the Law and Definitions of Crimes

The legal regulation in question moves beyond the traditional definition of espionage to create a broad and ambiguous spectrum of offenses. Under the law, not only is the transmission of state secrets to foreign intelligence services criminalized, but numerous acts defined as "indirect cooperation with a hostile state" are also included. These acts comprise engaging in rhetoric that demoralizes the public during wartime, transferring information or visuals to foreign media organizations, utilizing technological infrastructure services belonging to enemy countries (e.g., Starlink), sharing information regarding the positions of the Iranian Armed Forces or the Revolutionary Guards, and participating in protests (“New Iran espionage”, 2025; “Iran's crackdown”, 2025).

According to Persian sources, the revised version of the law includes a sweeping definition of crime described as "any operational activity contrary to national security or national interests" (“مجازات اعدام “, 2025). By categorizing each of these acts as "enemy-supported activity intended to undermine the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran," the law paves the way for aggravated penalties. These crimes, especially when committed during wartime, can be linked to capital offenses such as "Efsad-fil-Arz" (Corruption on Earth) or "Moharebeh" (waging war against God/the State), leading to penalties as severe as execution (Amnesty International, 2025).

The new regulation constitutes one of the harshest measures in the Iranian legal system regarding penal sanctions. According to the law, perpetrators may face the death penalty—the severest punishment—followed by aggravated sentences such as life imprisonment, deprivation of public rights, confiscation of property, and mandatory residence (internal exile) (“Iranian Parliament”, 2025; “Iran's Parliament”, 2025). In the updated version of the law, "the production, assembly, importation, and use of micro-aircraft, including small drones and quadcopters," have also been included among crimes warranting the death penalty (“مجلس طرح”, 2025). The text of the law differentiates the determination of punishment based on the "context" in which the crime is committed; the scale of punishment is automatically escalated in situations such as a state of war, a state of emergency, or a direct attack by a hostile country.

Objections of the Guardian Council and Constitutional Issues

Following its approval in Parliament, the law was subjected to review by the Guardian Council in accordance with Article 94 of the Iranian Constitution. In its assessment on July 9, 2025, the Council returned the text to Parliament, stating that certain provisions might contravene the Iranian Constitution and the fundamental principles of Islamic penal law (“New Iran espionage”, 2025; “Iran's crackdown”, 2025). Council spokesman Hadi Tahan-Nazif criticized the ambiguity of the crime definitions, the uncertainty of sentencing criteria, and the lack of clear provisions regarding the protection of individual rights during the judicial process (“سخنگوی شورای”, 2025; “ابهامات و ایرادات”, 2025). According to Tahan-Nazif, "there is uncertainty in the concepts of creating separatism and harming national security," a situation that could restrict legitimate freedoms (“ابهامات و ایرادات”, 2025).

For instance, what constitutes "forms of communication deemed as aiding the enemy," which media outlets are considered enemies, and what legal boundaries are crossed by using technologies like Starlink are not clearly defined. these uncertainties contradict both the principle of legality (certainty) in Islamic penal law and Articles 32 and 35 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the possibility that an individual could be sentenced to death solely for sharing an image or a social media post represents a violation of the principle of proportionality in criminal justice.

Parliament revised the law in line with the Guardian Council's objections and approved the updated version on July 13-14, 2025 (“Iran’s Parliament”, 2025; “Iranian Parliament”, 2025). However, the revised law retains most of the fundamental issues. Although Tahan-Nazif stated, according to Persian sources, that "these uncertainties and issues can be resolved," the problems inherent in the law's basic structure persist (“ابهامات و ایرادات”, 2025).

Political Context and Security Atmosphere

The 12-day Iran–Israel conflict in June 2025 went on record not only as a military loss for Tehran but also as a serious intelligence and internal security failure. Targeted Israeli operations resulted in severe damage to both the command centers of the Revolutionary Guards and critical nuclear facilities. According to analyses in Western sources and reports by The Times, it was revealed that most of these attacks were carried out through coordinates and information leaks provided from within, and that Israel has had agents on the ground in Iran since 2010 (“Shaken by depth”, 2025). Moreover, the fact that Israel targeted intelligence networks alongside military facilities during these attacks amplified concerns within the regime regarding structures referred to as "fifth column activities."

In the aftermath of the conflict, Iranian security forces arrested over 700 individuals on charges of espionage and collaboration with Israel (“Iranian authorities”, 2025; “Shaken by depth”, 2025). The Tehran administration evaluated this security breach not merely as an external threat, but as a result of internal negligence, weakness, and potential collaboration. The new law was shaped precisely in the midst of this atmosphere. With this regulation, the state not only claims to take measures against foreign intelligence but also attempts to construct a discourse reminding society and the opposition of the absolute boundaries of the "security state."

Political Function: Domestic Public Opinion and Role in Foreign Policy

Any legal regulation regarding security in Iran must be evaluated not merely as a technical adjustment, but also as a political message. In this sense, the new espionage law functions as a tool that fortifies the narrative that the regime is under siege, especially in the face of recent increases in criticism of the regime and social discontent. Existing mistrust within society, the economic crisis, corruption allegations, and criticisms regarding administrative weaknesses can be framed as security risks and criminalized through this law. This situation increases the regime's capacity to suppress internal opposition while simultaneously offering the opportunity to position individuals who do not show loyalty as potential threats.

On the foreign policy plane, the law aims to convey a message of "zero tolerance for infiltration activities" to actors viewed as adversaries, primarily Israel and the United States, while demonstrating to regional countries that Iran's internal security reflex has hardened and internal intelligence control has been increased. In this context, the law is not solely a subject of criminal law; it is a foundational building block of a new security discourse in Iran's domestic and foreign politics.

Practical Effects and Structural Limitations

Although the new espionage law envisions a harsh and comprehensive security mechanism on paper, structural problems likely to be encountered at the implementation level may limit its effectiveness. The Iranian security bureaucracy has long been plagued by parallel intelligence structures, overlapping jurisdictions, and a lack of inter-agency coordination. The friction between the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-IO) and the Ministry of Intelligence leads to disarray in intelligence production and the concentration of the information monopoly within specific groups. This situation may bring about arbitrary practices in the detection and substantiation of crimes under the law.

Additionally, the lack of technical surveillance infrastructure seriously limits the capacity of intelligence to detect leaks in advance. Therefore, while this law sends a strong symbolic and political message, in practice, it may stand out more as a tool to suppress the opposition and diverse spheres of thought internally rather than genuinely preventing espionage activities. Considering the legal uncertainties, the disproportionality of penalties, and the fragmentation among security institutions, it appears that this regulation will be instrumentalized to ensure internal stability rather than transforming Iran into a more resilient actor in intelligence wars.

Conclusion

The new counter-espionage law enacted by Iran in July 2025 was shaped directly in the aftermath of Israeli attacks and is a product of the quest to not only close security gaps but also re-establish social and political control. The law’s definitions of crimes are vague, its penalties excessively harsh, and its framework for implementation uncertain. While this situation undermines the principle of legal security, it increases the risk of the law turning into a potential tool for silencing dissenting voices. Furthermore, given the institutional disarray and structural problems in intelligence coordination in Iran, it is understood that this law is an internal political maneuver reinforcing security-oriented discourse rather than a measure to genuinely prevent external infiltration. Consequently, the new regulation should be read as a short-term crisis management tactic and a show of deterrence, rather than an objective to modernize Iran's intelligence capacity or strengthen it through structural reform.

References

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This article was originally published in Turkish on Platform on August 5, 2025.