Pahlavi nostalgia: A legacy without future
- Oral Toğa
- Sep 15
- 6 min read
Expectations of political change in Iran are voiced so frequently, especially among diaspora circles, that even without concrete developments inside the country, transition scenarios are already debated. This shows how political and intellectual discussions outside Iran often run on a different timeline from the realities within. Among the figures most often mentioned in these debates is the exiled crown prince, Reza Pahlavi.
When Iran’s last shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, left the country for the second time with his family on Jan. 16, 1979, his eldest son, Crown Prince Reza, was only 19. For the Pahlavi dynasty, once briefly exiled after the 1953 coup, this departure proved permanent. After the 1979 revolution, Reza Pahlavi settled in the United States. Following his father’s death in 1980, he assumed the title of “crown prince in exile.” In his early years, he focused on education and security. From the 1990s, he aligned with the rhetoric of the Iranian opposition, emphasizing democracy, human rights and secularism. Rather than openly demanding restoration of the monarchy, he argued for a political order based on the will of the people. In the 2000s, he became more visible in Washington-based media and think tanks, though statements hinting at cooperation with Israel and Gulf states drew sharp criticism inside Iran. In the 2010s, amid the Green Movement and Arab Spring, he proposed a “national transition council,” but failed to turn it into a tangible organization. Today, he remains the symbolic leader of monarchist groups in the diaspora, while his base inside Iran is weak and fragmented.
Time of Shah
It is often said that “the difficulty of progress leads to praise of the past.” In political science, this is described as the politics of nostalgia in societies facing a crisis. When structural barriers obstruct social progress or when the existing regime falls into a crisis of legitimacy, a selective memory of the past comes into play, which is nourished by idealized images. The flaws and contradictions of the past are erased and replaced by symbols of order, prosperity or national unity.
In Iran, the Pahlavi dynasty has become the focal point of precisely this nostalgic mechanism. In today’s Iran, the return of the monarchy is not regarded as a real possibility, yet for those dissatisfied with the regime, the Pahlavi era serves as a reminder of a “lost stability.” In this way, the Pahlavis function less as a political force and more as a vehicle for nostalgic projection.
There is a popular joke in Iran: it is said that Persian has four tenses, the past tense ("zaman-e gozashteh"), the present tense ("zaman-e hal"), the future tense ("zaman-e ayandeh"), and the “time of the Shah” ("zaman-e Shah"). People, especially in urban areas, refer so often to the “time of the Shah” that it has become a running joke.
Faced with today’s economic hardships, political repression and social restrictions, people frequently use this phrase to draw direct comparisons with the past. The expression “it wasn’t like this in the Shah’s time” is more than a complaint; it is also a safe way of questioning the current system. This nostalgia expresses a longing for the past, while at the same time underlining present difficulties and opening the door to alternative futures. The notion of “Shah’s time” thus becomes a tool that blends humour with criticism and keeps political memory alive.
'Reza Shah Rouhat Shad'
At almost every demonstration against the government and the system, the slogan “Reza Shah Rouhat Shad” (“Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed/may you rest in peace”) is chanted. The power of this slogan lies in Reza Shah’s embodiment of a secular, progressive and outward-looking vision of Iran. From education and law to infrastructure and administrative organization, the reforms he initiated remain alive in people’s minds as a standard of comparison in today’s atmosphere of crisis. Iranian society, despite all restrictions, follows the outside world closely. Family ties across the diaspora and digital platforms reinforce this awareness. Yet the current difficulty of leaving the country, even for tourism, also makes Reza Shah a symbol of a world once open but now closed.
However, this nostalgic admiration does not extend to his grandson in equal measure. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, though he continues under the shadow of his family’s historical legacy, has not inherited the charismatic, founding image that Iranians associate with his grandfather. His name may surface as a symbol among diaspora groups and segments of the urban opposition, but within Iran, his presence remains limited and fragmented.
Political limits of Reza Pahlavi
Despite the nostalgia and growing discontent with the system, there are several reasons why Reza Pahlavi has failed to become an effective political actor inside Iran. The first and perhaps most important obstacle is the absence of a natural leadership figure within Iran’s anti-system opposition, and Pahlavi’s inability to fill that gap. The support directed toward him often feels imposed rather than organic, shaped more as an externally projected alternative than as a genuine demand from society. For this reason, his name may suddenly gain attention, but the very same groups can just as quickly shift toward republican demands or even turn against him. All in all, it’s hard to say that he truly has supporters inside Iran.
A second factor is the gap between his online presence and political reality. One of the most visible elements backing Pahlavi in the diaspora is networks of social media activists, often referred to as his “troll army.” These networks largely consist of anonymous accounts that conceal their identities while using extreme language, swinging between exaggerated praise and harsh denunciation. They elevate Pahlavi to the role of “Iran’s only hope,” while targeting his critics with labels such as “traitor,” “regime agent” or “mullah’s servant.” Coordinated hashtag campaigns, agenda engineering and online mob attacks amplify his digital presence far beyond its real scale. Yet, such aggressive methods often alienate other opposition groups and push the monarchist movement into a marginal position rather than projecting broad social support.
A third limitation lies in the very nature of nostalgia for the Pahlavi era. The phrase “the time of the shah” frequently resurfaces in political debates, revived under the shadow of today’s difficulties. But confusing nostalgic longing with concrete political demands becomes an obstacle to building a coherent opposition strategy. Moreover, many view the idea of reviving the monarchy as unrealistic, and the notion of an “inherited throne” sits uneasily with democratic discourse. Thus, the Pahlavi name may serve as a symbol of the past, but it fails to provide an inclusive project for the future.
Finally, although Reza Pahlavi has for years spoken of a “free Iran” and a “transitional period,” he has not produced a concrete roadmap on fundamental issues such as the economy, ethnic minorities, women’s rights or foreign policy. Beyond being the “crown prince” and “legitimate heir,” he lacks a political vision that can stand on its own. Some of his statements during the Iran-Israel conflict provoked strong reactions and distanced him further from public opinion inside the country. Calling on people to take to the streets while bombs were falling on their cities, and at the same time appearing aligned with the very actors carrying out the attacks, clashed with the strong nationalist sensitivities that shape Iranian society. Even if such a figure somehow assumed leadership, it would be nearly impossible for him to consolidate power. Over time, he would be seen by many as a collaborator with the enemy.
Can Shah truly govern?
Underground networks within the establishment are already preparing for a systemic crisis. At the same time, nationalist groups are likely to portray Reza Pahlavi as someone collaborating with foreign powers. Because, as anyone familiar with modern Iranian history knows, Iran’s anti-Western sentiment predates the Islamic Revolution and reaches back to the late 19th century. In any post-crisis scenario, the possibility of the country fragmenting could inflict a deep trauma on society and generate wider support for clandestine organizations.
At the same time, Iran faces structural problems that cannot be resolved simply by a change of regime. Economic hardship, unemployment, environmental crises and social inequality are not issues that can disappear overnight. Even if Pahlavi were to come to power, people would still be grappling with the same problems, and disappointment could quickly overtake expectations with the view that “nothing has changed, things have only got worse.”
In such a situation, the narrative that “the mullahs caused this destruction” may not resonate strongly. Nostalgic reflexes would reappear, and discourses emphasizing how “patriotic” and “national” the clerics were could easily find support, particularly in rural areas. For this reason, even if Reza Pahlavi were to come to power through foreign backing, it seems unlikely that he could truly govern. He would likely face much fiercer social and political opposition than his father ever did.
Scenarios about the Pahlavi dynasty surface often, especially in diaspora debates. Yet, when historical memory, social sensitivities and unresolved structural problems are considered, it seems improbable that Reza Pahlavi could establish lasting relevance inside Iran. Nostalgic symbols may keep him in public debate, but if he ever came to power, he would still face the same crises, and expectations would quickly collapse into disillusionment. At present, nothing inside Iran suggests a rupture that could fundamentally shake the system. That is why the “Pahlavi question” remains detached from political reality.
The dynasty endures not in Iran’s future but in its memories, and memories alone do not topple regimes. No matter how coordinated the online troll farms become, this reality does not change.
This article was first published in Daily Sabah newspaper on 28.08.2025
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