Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh’s Life and Iran’s Political Situation Before His Premiership
Mohammad Mosaddegh was born in Tehran on June 16, 1882, and died there on March 5, 1967. He served as prime minister for two years, from 1951 to 1953, before being overthrown in a joint US–British coup in 1953. His nationalization of British oil installations and his power struggle with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left a particular mark on modern Iranian history.
Mosaddegh came from an aristocratic family. His father, like him, held various state offices. He was eight when the famous Tobacco Protest erupted. He stood for election to the first parliament in 1906 from Isfahan and won, but could not take his seat because of the age requirement. This was his first political step. He went to the Faculty of Political Science in Paris but had to return to Iran because of undiagnosed illnesses. Later, like the younger Shah Pahlavi, he studied in Switzerland, earning a doctorate in law at the University of Lausanne. He avoided using the hereditary title “al-Saltaneh,” preferring “doctor” in recognition of his doctorate. Although he came to power with middle-class support, he had blood and marital ties to the aristocracy. He was the direct grandson of the famous Mohsen Ashtiani, chief minister to Fath Ali Shah.
Following the elder Pahlavi’s coup in 1921, Mosaddegh served first as finance minister and then as foreign minister. In 1923, he was elected to the National Consultative Assembly. When Reza Pahlavi proclaimed himself shah in 1925, Mosaddegh opposed the move and was removed from all his posts. After the elder Shah’s deposition in 1941, he returned to political life and was elected to parliament in 1944. The 1940s were a period of complex politics and rising nationalism in Iran. The government faced Soviet and British pressure abroad and unrest at home. On one side were Islamists led by Ayatollah Seyyed Kashani, later one of Mosaddegh’s major supporters. They opposed anything entering Iran from the West and resisted even the slightest modernization initiative. On another side was the well-organized, communist, Moscow-aligned Tudeh Party. Between them stood nationalists, reformists, and republicans seeking to reform the whole system. Their ranks also included officers impatient to seize power at the first opportunity.
It is difficult, then, to speak of political unity in Iran during those years. The political groups’ only common ground could be described as hostility to the West focused on Britain. To understand the hatred directed at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, one need only compare the profits accruing to the company and to Iran. The company declared profits of £250 million between 1945 and 1950; Iran received £90 million, less than the British government collected in tax from the company. Rumors that Britain supplied its navy with cheap fuel further inflamed public anger. Political positions increasingly drew support from rhetoric directed against the company, which appeared to symbolize Western “wickedness.” During these years, the Fada’iyan-e Islam organization also assassinated people it declared “infidels.” One attempt targeted the Shah, who escaped with minor injuries.
This was Iran’s political atmosphere as Mosaddegh rose to prominence. A British chargé d’affaires summed up the period’s corruption in a speech to Tehran’s parliament: “Members of parliament expect bribes.” In the late 1940s, Mosaddegh successfully mounted strong opposition to granting the Soviets concessions to explore for and extract oil in northern Iran. He then began a campaign against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, gaining public support and respect by calling for its nationalization. He submitted a bill in 1951, which parliament passed. This parliamentary decision strengthened Mosaddegh’s position, forcing the Shah to appoint him prime minister.
The decision ushered in political and economic crisis. Since the Qajar era, many sectors had been in foreign hands, giving foreigners control over Iran’s economy. Britain soon withdrew from Iran’s oil market and lodged a complaint against Iran at the United Nations. Mosaddegh responded by closing the British embassy and seeking new markets for Iranian oil. His failure to find them deepened the economic difficulties. Trying to counter Mosaddegh’s growing power, the Shah attempted to dismiss him by decree in August 1953, but fled in fear following mass unrest. Shortly afterward, Mosaddegh’s opponents overthrew him in the joint British–American operation known as Ajax—as senior US officials later acknowledged—and secured the Shah’s return.
Operation TP-AJAX
The political circumstances behind the operation have been outlined above. After parliament nationalized the oil installations, Britain initially sought to bring Iran into line through economic pressure. It then tried intimidation by massing troops in Cyprus. The Soviet Union did not remain silent, beginning to deploy troops along Iran’s border. Britain’s withdrawal of its technicians left Iran short of skilled personnel and in serious difficulty. Britain used its international influence to secure an embargo. Oil trusts were warned; a few US companies wanted agreements but were later forced to withdraw. An agreement allowing Iranian currency to be converted into sterling at a preferential rate was canceled, leaving Iran facing a major foreign-exchange crisis.
The public reacted fiercely. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s general manager’s house was burned, and major demonstrations took place at the Abadan oil installations. Mosaddegh did not leave Britain’s hostile actions unanswered: he closed the British embassy and expelled all British nationals.
After the closure of its embassy, Britain turned to the United States for help in expanding its room for maneuver. The Truman administration, reluctant to lose Iran and wary of a possible war, did not respond to its requests.
The turning point was the US presidential election of November 1952. Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman, sided with Britain, and Operation TP-Ajax was set in motion. Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt and the CIA’s chief for the Near East and Asia, was appointed to direct it.
The operation began with psychological warfare against Mosaddegh. Britain’s solid intelligence network, built over decades, made it easier for US intelligence to manipulate or buy individuals. Journalists, local gangs, and clerics were bought and used. Attacks were mounted against Mosaddegh and his home. Although he escaped injury, the press created the impression that he had staged them himself. As a result of this black propaganda, he began losing his greatest supporters one by one.
To lend the coup legitimacy, the Shah was then asked to sign two decrees dismissing Mosaddegh, and the decrees were obtained. While they were being delivered, a decision was simultaneously taken to arrest the army commander, General Riahi. On the night of August 15, Colonel Nassiri, an Imperial Guard officer fiercely loyal to the monarchy, went to the general’s home carrying the decrees to arrest him. Rumors of the planned coup, however, had already
reached the general, who had left home as a precaution. Mosaddegh then appeared in a live broadcast and announced that an attempted coup devised by the Shah and his “foreign collaborators” had been suppressed. Fearing the public’s fury, the Shah flew out of the country himself. Although the coup appeared to have been defeated, Kermit Roosevelt reported that he would continue the operation and remained in Iran.
Roosevelt met General Zahedi, who was intended to replace Mosaddegh, and they devised a new plan. They first copied the Shah’s decrees and began distributing them covertly, particularly in southern Tehran’s gang-dominated neighborhoods. Their control of the media ensured the decrees appeared on newspaper front pages the next day. Meanwhile, disturbances escalated and the streets descended into chaos. Mosaddegh made no countermove. On August 19, 1953, he was finally removed from office.
Immediately after his removal, Mosaddegh was charged with treason. He spent about three years in prison, then remained under house arrest until his death. Having defeated his prime minister, the Shah returned with his power consolidated and ruled until the Islamic Revolution. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright first acknowledged in 2000 that the United States and Britain had jointly conducted the operation; President Obama did so in 2009. Finally, exactly sixty years after the coup, the CIA officially acknowledged its involvement.
Conclusion
Iranians have never forgotten Mosaddegh’s overthrow. It uprooted their last hopes that their national opposition to foreign concessions might finally find expression in politics. Although Western powers appeared successful in the short and medium term, the Islamic Revolution and subsequent Iranian policies show that the longer-term consequences were different.
As time passed, the Shah’s growing expenditure and the correspondingly deepening poverty, increased rural-to-urban migration, and other socioeconomic problems strengthened attachment to the values embodied and represented by Mosaddegh. The coup was a decisive turning point in the anti-Western rhetoric and policies Iran has pursued ever since. Understanding the 1979 hostage crisis and subsequent events requires a sound understanding of Operation Ajax’s impact on the Iranian people.
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