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Iran after the Twelve-Day Conflict: Transition to a Proactive Security Doctrine

Oral Toğa12 September 20251 min read

The high-intensity Iran-Israel conflict that took place between June 13 and 24, 2025, displayed a character that went beyond the patterns of conventional interstate warfare. This process was recorded as a multi-domain, multi-actor engagement. The target set extended to nuclear infrastructure, command-and-control centers, energy lines, internal security nodes, and cognitive/psychological influence points, and, in addition to land, sea, and air elements, simultaneous effects were produced in the cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information/psychological domains through joint operational planning conducted via proxy networks and local partners. In this way, not only Iran's military capacity but also its OODA loop and deterrence architecture were suppressed according to the logic of a kill web (engagement network/strike network).

The ceasefire declared on June 24 produced neither a rupture in the parties' strategic orientations nor a lasting rebalancing of their force dispositions; it merely carried the conflict into an intermediate phase (intra-conflict). Reading this process as an opportunity for "repositioning and capacity restoration," Tehran simultaneously put into effect measures such as the regeneration of air defense layers, command redundancies, the recovery of missile/UAV production and distribution cycles, the adjustment of its EMS-EW (electronic warfare) posture, the reactivation of proxy networks, and the updating of civil defense and evacuation chains. ...

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