On May 25, Greece seized a tanker carrying Iranian oil that had taken shelter in its territorial waters after a malfunction, igniting tensions between the two countries. Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization said Greece had acted at the United States’ request and called the seizure piracy. The naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responded quickly, seizing two Greek tankers in the Persian Gulf on May 27 and escalating diplomatic tensions. In a statement, the Greek Foreign Ministry said Iran had seized the two tankers 22 miles off its coast and described this as piracy. It warned of negative consequences for EU–Iran relations and advised Greek citizens against travel to Iran.
The United States also reacted promptly. Secretary of State Antony Blinken strongly condemned Iran’s actions in a statement, calling them “a threat to maritime security and the global economy.” Washington also announced a telephone conversation with Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias. EU officials issued a similar statement, expressing deep concern. The presence of a crew member from Southern Cyprus on one tanker also drew in the Greek Cypriot administration, whose Foreign Ministry called on Iran to release its citizen immediately.
Another point, though not central to the incident itself, deserves noting. Turkish media have particularly interpreted the crisis through the US–Greek rapprochement increasingly debated in recent months. Yet it also occurred while Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration were pursuing active diplomacy with Gulf countries. In recent months, both have held diplomatic activities and meetings almost daily with countries from Jordan to Qatar and Egypt to Saudi Arabia. Contacts with Israel take place at various levels almost every month. There has been particular discussion of Greece deploying Patriot missiles to protect Saudi Arabia. How Iran views Greece’s efforts to expand its Middle Eastern presence, partly driven by its disputes with Türkiye, remains unclear. Still, the timing of these mutual challenges should be remembered. Some Greek press articles address the issue by emphasizing these developments.
Reactions in Greece
The prevailing public mood in Greece has been to question why it seized the tanker and the reasons behind its action. The government faces questions from many quarters. Lengthy press articles have explained the incident and why Greece acted as it did, but these began appearing not after the May 25 seizure, but after Iran seized the Greek tankers on May 27. The crisis occurred at a time when the opposition was strongly criticizing the Mitsotakis administration and its foreign policy. It prompted accusations that Greek diplomacy had been harmed for American interests. In a statement, the main opposition party SYRIZA, which governed in the previous term, disapproved of Iran’s retaliation but said the government owed an explanation, submitting three questions. It asked what legal basis justified detaining the ship, given the decision of the single-member Court of First Instance in Chalkida and the decision to satisfy the Americans. It also questioned the legal basis for the US request for judicial assistance, reminding the government that although the United States had left the nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—the EU and Greece remained engaged in the process.
On June 2, Associate Professor Sotiris Roussos of the University of the Peloponnese, director of the Center for Mediterranean, Middle East, and Islamic Studies, published an article through the Institute for Alternative Policies think tank. It received extensive Greek press coverage. His article, “Foreign Policy in Troubled Waters: Between Karystos and the Gulf,” addressed the issue point by point, asking: “Are we taking on the role of ‘gendarme’ for allied interests? If so, for what ‘benefit’?” He discussed developments in Greek–Iranian relations in seven points. He reminded the government that Saudi Arabia had supported Greece on Cyprus and Thrace for over thirty years; that Iran was the only country to supply Greece oil on credit during its 2011 bankruptcy crisis, meeting 50 percent of its needs; that relations with Iran had been frozen following rapprochement with Israel; that Mitsotakis had openly welcomed Qasem Soleimani’s killing, an objectionable stance comparable to Türkiye killing a Greek special-forces member for supporting the PKK; and that Greece had deployed Patriot missiles to protect Saudi Arabia. He then asked whether the government had assessed the risks of becoming involved in Middle Eastern affairs and what benefit joining conflicts alongside Saudi Arabia and Israel would bring Greece.
Reactions in Iran
After Greece seized the tanker, Iran’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Greek chargé d’affaires and the Swiss chargé d’affaires, who represents US diplomatic interests, to convey its objections. Retaliation followed, and footage of the operation was released to the press a few days later.
After the retaliation, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Saeed Khatibzadeh tweeted that the crews were safe, relations had always rested on mutual respect, and narrow-minded calculations—including robbery ordered by third parties—should not damage those ties. Responding later to criticism from Western countries including Germany, France, and the United States, he said at a press conference: “Such interference in our country’s independent judiciary will not help resolve the problems.” Regarding Greek reactions, he added: “As we have told the Greek authorities, rather than acting politically and through the media, they should seek a legal resolution with our competent authorities.” At another press conference, he similarly told Greek officials: “Hire a lawyer instead of making a fuss; we, as the Foreign Ministry, will help.”
On May 29, Tasnim carried an analysis by Arab commentator and Al-Youm columnist Abdel Bari Atwan. He linked the move to two issues. First, it sent a strong message that Iran would immediately respond to any regional or international infringement of its sovereignty. Second, uncertainty persisted over nuclear negotiations. He emphasized Western “hypocrisy”: Iran was accused of piracy, while Greece’s action, also piracy, went unacknowledged by the West. He also recalled earlier Iranian reprisals, including tanker disputes with South Korea and Britain and the attacks on Erbil.
Conclusion
The tanker crisis occurred while Greece was expanding cooperation with the Arab world to establish a Middle Eastern presence. The Greek public questioned its rationale. The main opposition saw the seizure as an attempt to satisfy America and asked what Greek interest it served and on what legal grounds it rested. Iran, meanwhile, clearly sought to send a message through a swift response, avoid appearing weak, and maintain leverage. It is clear that the matter will be resolved without dragging on. Yet, like earlier seizures, it may remain in memory, having been noted by Iran, and indirectly affect bilateral relations in the medium term. Finally, Iran, believing Greece acted on US orders, can be expected to scrutinize Greek activities in the Middle East more closely, treating every step as an American move and responding accordingly. This crisis is a direct manifestation of US influence over Greece affecting Iran.
This article was first published by the Center for Iranian Studies (İRAM) on June 3, 2022.
Link: https://www.iramcenter.org/iran-ve-yunanistan-kamuoyunda-tanker-krizinin-yansimalari-754